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At least ten armed conflicts at sea since W orld War II have involved targeting 
issues concerning enemy merchant shipping and neutral vessels that have 
acquired enemy character: the Korean conflict of 1950-53 and naval actions 
connected with the civil war in China, 1949-58; the Arab-Israeli conflicts of 
1948-57, 1967, 1973 and 1982; the India-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971; the 
Vietnam War, with principal U.S. forces involvement between 1962 and 1973; 
the Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982; and, most importandy, the Iran-Iraq 
Tanker War of 1980-88. There was no global war similar to the experiences of 
World Wars I and II; in all cases the arenas of attack were relatively localized. 
However, to some participants the conflict was total, e.g., the Tanker War as to 
the belligerents, Iran and Iraq; to neutral bystanders, involved to a greater or 
lesser degree (e.g. the United States in the Tanker War), the conflict was only a 
regional, second or third level affair. 
Although these conflicts overlapped each other in point of beginning and 
duration, they may be analyzed conveniendy in the sequence listed above. This 
chapter will also attempt to interweave other major sources of state practice -
e.g., treaties, l in some cases like UNCLOS,2 not yet in force - that may have 
impact on this area, albeit tangentially, in the future. It might be noted that other 
sources of state practice or custom, the theme of this chapter, may be found in 
[D]iplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press releases, the opinions of 
official legal advisers, official manuals on legal questions, e.g. manuals of military 
law, executive decisions and practices, orders to naval forces, etc., comments by 
governments on drafts produced by the International Law Commission; state 
legislation, international and national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and 
other international instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, and 
resolutions relating to legal questions in the United Nations General Assembly. 
Obviously the value of these sources varies and such depends on the circumstan-
3 ces. 
Most modem military manuals, e.g., NWP 9A, contain a "disclaimer clause," 
which says that although the publications cannot be considered as binding on 
courts, "their contents may possess evidentiary value in matters relating to U.S. 
custom and practice. ,,4 And besides customary and treaty sources, there may be 
general principles of law, authoritative treatises, other research of competent 
scholars, court decisions, or perhaps resolutions of international organizations, 
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that may impact the law-defining process.5 Some of these sources, e.g., actions 
of international organizations, may appear for the first time in the time frame of 
this analysis, 1945-90, while others have been sources, perhaps subsidiary to 
custom, treaties and general principles, for a long time.6 
The general format of this chapter is analysis, on a general time line when the 
conflict occurred, grouping adversaries where successive conflicts have occurred, 
e.g., Korea, 1950-53, and naval activity connected with the Chinese civil war, 
followed by the 1948-1957, 1967, 1973, and 1982 Arab-Israeli conflicts, etc. 
Within each conflict, or set of conflicts, state practice will be analyzed first. This 
will be followed by other primary sources developed during the time frame, e.g., 
treaties binding on the parties, and then by other developments in international 
law - e.g., treaties that would apply to future wars at sea, treaties not related to 
armed conflict but whose principles may be arguably applicable in the future, 
and the research results of major commentators. While this has made for a longer 
chapter, it is hoped (and submitted) that the comprehensive approach may be 
more useful than examination of state practice in isolation from other sources. 
This chapter is limited to its topic. Full analysis of issues involving the results 
of attacks on truly neutral merchant shipping, which are strictly prohibited? 
attacks on enemy warships or naval auxiliaries, which are permitted;8 attacks on 
warships of neutrals, which are prohibited;9 and attacks on certain protected 
vessels, e.g., hospital ships, which are prohibited;10 are not always given full 
analysis. For example, specific humanitarian law rules that flow from such attacks 
may be discussed only tangentially, e.g., the particular rules for notification of 
casualties. The same is true for claims concerning accidental attacks in peacetime, 
or sea-air warfare, such as the Airbus incident during the Tanker War. The 
chapter confines itself to high seas situations. 
II. State Practice and Other Sources of International 
Law Since World War II 
The postwar era began with ratification of the U.N. Charter, whose articles 
51 and 52 recognize the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, 
and the right to establish regional arrangements or agencies to deal with matters 
relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as appropriate for 
regional action. Article 2(4) of the Charter declares that all U.N. members shall 
refrain from the threat, or use, offorce against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state. Article 2(3) states the correlative principle that U.N. 
members must settle international disputes by peaceful means so that "interna-
tional peace and security, and justice, are not endangered." There is, of course, 
an inherent tension between the principles of Articles 2(3) and 2(4) and Articles 
51 and 52, in that the use offorce in self-defense, perhaps through an Article 52 
agency, will almost invariably involve the territorial integrity or political 
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independence of a state to which the defensive response is directed. Settlement 
by peaceful means is the polar opposite to the threat or use of force permitted 
under the principles of self-defense. However, Article 2(3)'s peaceful means 
provision is qualified by the paramountcy of international peace and security, and 
the order of listing of Purposes of the United Nations, as well as the content of 
subsequent Charter provisions, supports the view that the maintenance of peace 
and security is "the primary purpose of the Organization and takes priority over 
other purposes."l1 Since the "inherent right of self-defense" is preserved under 
article 51 in the absence of action by the Security Council, and is a correlative 
of actions the Council might take,12 the right of self-defense is part of the 
corrective mechanisms (albeit through self-help) the Charter contemplates. 
Besides the preservation of the right of self-defense, the Charter also provides, 
in Chapter VI, for pacific settlement of disputes, including investigations, 
recommendations and decisions by the Security Council of disputes "likely" to 
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.13 The Charter 
also gives the Security Council, in Chapter VII, authority to act to deal with 
threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression. Nonforce actions 
that the Council may direct include "complete or partial interruption of 
economic relations and of ... sea, air and other means of communications "under 
Article 41. Article 42 gives the Council the option of deciding on force, 
including "demonstration, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land 
forces of Members .... " (Chapter VII also includes Article 51, with its statement 
of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.1'1 Although the 
principal institution for implementing Council action, the Military Staff Com-
mittee, withered during the Cold War,lS U.N. Members remain liable to obey 
the Council's "decisions,,,16 which have been issued only rarely because of that 
Cold War. Thus one of the primary foci for enforcement of states' rights under 
international law for 1945-90 has been self-help, through claims of self-defense, 
anticipatory self-defense, nonforce reprisal and retorsion. 
Self-defense has two elements, necessity and proportionality, and for U.S. 
practice includes the right of anticipatory self-defense, perhaps on a global scale, 
involving use of armed force where there is a clear necessity that is "instant, 
overwhelming, and leaving no reasonable choice of peaceful means. ,,17 The basic 
self-defense principles, tersely articulated in the Charter in 1945 and developed 
through state practice since then, might come into play at the beginning of any 
armed conflict where enemy merchant ships are at sea or are being convoyed 
by enemy warships, or situations might develop during armed conflict involving 
neutral vessels. Two views have developed as to the scope of self-defense after 
ratification of the Charter. The U.S. position has been that a parallel customary 
right of self-defense exists alongside Article 51,18 while others have argued that 
the Charter comprehends the scope of the right, i.e., that the right to self-defense 
occurs only when there is an armed attack.19 And, as will be seen, the peacetime 
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law of the sea declares that merchant ships have the nationality of the state whose 
flag they fly, so long as there is a "genuine and effective link." between the flag 
state and the vesse1.20 Thus a violation of Charter Article 2(4) might be claimed 
if there is an unwarranted attack on a neutral merchant ship as much as if a 
battleship bombarded a neutral coast or an army invaded neutral territory?1 
Self-defense, whether anticipatory or in response to an attack, can be asserted in 
several contexts, e.g., unit self-defense, where a particular ship, aircraft or group 
of units (e.g., a carrier battlegroup) responds to use, or threat of use, of force; 
national self-defense, where other forces, citizens or territory are involved.22 
Those who would deny validity to the u.S. position would also say that there 
is therefore no right of anticipatory self-defense, although Professor Dinstein has 
taken an interesting middle view in suggesting a right of "interceptive" self-
defense, i.e., that an attack "occurs" when one party "embarks upon an 
irreversible course of action, thereby crossing the Rubicon.,,23 This is close to 
the u.S. position of anticipatory self-defense, which in the u.S. view is 
permitted when "there is a clear necessity that is instant, overwhelming and 
leaving no reasonable choice of peaceful means, ,,24 as stated above. 
Beyond the case of self-defense for a single state, the Charter, Article 51, 
affirms the right of collective self-defense. The result has been formation of 
bilateral and multilateral treaties, which, when duly published, communicate the 
existence of a critical defense zone (CDZ), perhaps of half a continent. For the 
now-defunct USSR, this had been Eastern Europe.25 The Western Europe 
counterpart has been NATO, with its carefully-delineated boundaries that do 
not include all the national territories of its partners as applicable for a required 
collective response.26 The existence of a formal treaty arrangement may not be 
necessary to signal a CDZ,27 but it frequently is, as in the case of NATO. 
There is a similar division of authority on the use of armed force reprisals after 
1945 in situations not involving armed conflict. Reprisals are proportional 
responses, illegal as a matter of international law, to a prior act illegal under 
international law by another nation?S Most authorities say that reprisals involv-
ing use of force cannot be asserted as a matter of self-defense;29 a few have taken 
a contrary position.3o NWP 9A appears to take no position on the issue, but its 
analysis of wartime reprisals and the severe limitations that international law and 
u.S. policy would place on such reprisals31 would tend to the view that u.S. 
policy opposes forcible reprisals in peacetime. Reprisals of a non-force nature, 
e.g., economic sanctions directed at a nation violating international law, are valid 
in the Charter era.32 Retorsions - unfriendly but legal responses to other nations' 
actions, e.g. conscious refusal of a warship to respond to a dipped ensign of 
another nation's merchantmen - also remain valid responses.33 
The problem has been compounded by the recognition that there has been 
no bright-line division between peace and war,34 and that therefore a static set 
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of rules, some to be applied during wartime and others applicable during peace, 
is not a useful concept for many situations. 
For the particular issue of this book - attacks on merchant ships - there is 
another set of issues, springing from the nature of commercial ventures at sea 
for most of this century. Flags of convenience, now euphemized as open registry, 
have called into question the nationality of the merchantman, whose connection 
with the flag state may be nominal.35 The ship may be crewed by nationals of 
several states, while its officers may have allegiance to another nation. The vessel 
may be owned by a corporation whose stockholders are not nationals of the flag 
state. The insurance coverage may be spread among still other states' nationals. 
The cargo may be consigned to one person, or it may be beneficially owned by 
many, and the same may be said of cargo insurers. The ship may be chartered 
to another national, and there may be sub charterers as well, each with their own 
insurance coverage. Today nonbulk cargo is frequendy lifted by sealed con-
tainers, perhaps loaded and sealed by the consigner, for which the bill oflading 
may recite that the container is "said to contain" certain items, with a resulting 
problem for a visiting officer searching for contraband.36 Even though the USSR 
with its system of state ownership is collapsing, many nations operate commercial 
shipping companies, for which the defense of sovereign immunity mayor may 
not be available, depending on the cargo.37 Although the rule of the 1909 
London Declaration that warships may rely on the flag the merchantman flies 
for visit and search purposes,38 the existence of other interests, and behind them 
the states whose nationals are interested, cannot be dismissed as a factor in the 
problem. Given the "intermediate" status of most armed conflict situations today 
- somewhere on the continuum between peace and total war39 - the problem 
is likely to be more difficult, and claims more frequent, than in a W orId War 
II-style scenario. 
These preliminary remarks are generally directed at the beginning of hostilities 
in the Charter era, i.e., after 1945, but they might also apply if a neutral merchant 
vessel is perceived to be on unneutral service 40 or if a neutral power becomes 
involved in the conflict after initial commencement of hostilities. 
From the problems of jus ad bello to problems of jus in bello in recent armed 
conflict situations41 we now tum. 
A. Korea: 1950-53, and the Civil War in China, 1949-58 
Immediately after the invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in late June 
1950, the U.N. Security Council authorized the United States to respond to the 
attack and called upon all nations to assist in that effort. The Soviet Union was 
not present when the Council vote was taken and hence did not veto these 
resolutions.42 
As part of this response, the United States, on July 4, 1950, informed the 
U.N. Secretary-General "that, in support of the resolution approved by the 
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Security Council relative to the attack upon the Republic of Korea [ROK] 
involving forces from North Korea, ... a naval blockade of the entire Korean 
coast" had been ordered by the President of the United States.43 Notice of the 
blockade had been broadcast on July 4; its 390 35'N and 41 0 51 'N limits "were 
established to keep all sea forces well clear of both Russian and Chinese 
territory," thus allowing access to territory of nonbelligerents. Both the USSR 
and the People's Republic of China (PRC) protested the blockade and refused 
to acknowledge its existence or legality although both observed it. All warships 
except North Korean vessels were allowed to enter North Korean ports; all other 
ships were barred. Although blockading forces were meager at first, the blockade 
was soon set and became effective along 500 miles of the Korean peninsula. Mter 
initial attempts to break the blockade, there was no active surface or submarine 
and little air opposition. Mines laid by North Korea with Soviet assistance were 
employed, however.44 
The blockade of Korea had several important ramifications for international 
law. First, it was part of the first major peacekeeping operation authorized by 
the Security Council under the Charter. Second, the Council authorization for 
U.S. leadership in the defense of Korea began the practice of the "agency 
principle,,45 used in subsequent operations directed by the Council - e.g., 
Rhodesia 46 _ or recommended by the General Assembly.47 Third, practice under 
the blockade conformed to previously-established principles of the law of 
blockade and thereby reinforced them.48 
U.N. naval forces also evacuated diplomatic personnel and U.S. civilians 
aboard U.S. warships after the initial North Korean attack in 1950; some 
dependents were evacuated by commercial shipping.49 Substantial numbers of 
Koreans who wanted to leave North Korean-occupied South Korea or North 
Korea were also evacuated by these ships when U.N. land forces later rolled 
north or were pushed south.50 The evacuations were well-advertised in the 
media, although there were no formal agreements between U.N. forces and 
North Korea, as customary law would dictate. Adversaries to these operations 
did not attack the evacuation ships, but if they had, there would have been 
possible violations of the rules against attacking cartel vessels or ships performing 
humanitarian missions.51 The use of media announcements in lieu of agreements 
was an extension of the traditional rule requiring prior agreements between 
belligerents.52 As such, the U.N. procedure was the beginning of incipient 
custom as to the procedure. 
Local convoy operations began soon after hostilities;53 no trans-Pacific 
convoying was employed. 54 Vessels escorted included at least 40 Japanese-
owned freighters under the control of Shipping Control Administration, Japan 
(SCAJAP); U.S. Army transports and cargo ships, and Military Sea Transporta-
tion Service (MSTS) vessels under command of the Chief of Naval Operations 
of the U.S. Navy. SCAJAP was part of the U.S. administrative structure for the 
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occupation of Japan. MSTS vessels included commissioned naval vessels (desig-
nated U.S.S. like warships but primarily cargo carriers in nature), U.S. civil 
service-manned ships (designated U.S.N.S.), and a tanker fleet under time 
charter to MSTS from private companies. 55 As in the case of ships involved with 
evacuations,56 there were no attacks on the convoys, which shuttled warfighting 
and war-sustaining personnel and goods from Japan and elsewhere to the Korean 
peninsula. Attacks on these convoys, whether the ships were under SCAJAP, 
U.S. Army, or MSTS control, would have been justified as military convoys for 
the warfighting/war-sustaining effort.57 Since some of the same merchantmen 
may have been employed for law-protected voyages (e.g., cartels or evacuations), 
and at other times in carriage of warfighting or war-sustaining efforts, the 
dilemma of the 1907 Hague Convention (VII) on conversion of merchant ships 
to warships58 is apparent and illustrates the Convention's possible supersession 
in practice.59 (The United States is not a party to Hague VII.)60 
U.N. forces took the position that since fish was an important source offood 
for North Korea, including its armed forces, destruction of all fishing boats, 
inshore and offihore, was strategically necessary.61 Commander Fenrick has 
stated that 
the anti-fishing campaign appears to have been an extension beyond previous 
practice. It must, however, be conceded that ... contraband lists in World War 
II specified food as conditional contraband .... Although all the naval weapons 
were used, neither nuclear weapons nor submarines in the commerce destruction 
role were used during the conflict.62 
Although a naval blockade of the PRC was considered after the Chinese 
intervention in the Korean peninsula land campaign, those plan "folders stayed 
on the shel£" Throughout the conflict, "In the northern Sea of Japan the ... 
Soviet Far Eastern Fleet maneuvered, undisturbed and undisturbing.,,63 Later in 
the war, on September 27,1952, U.N. Commander (and U.S. General) Mark 
W. Clark proclaimed a Sea Defense Zone (SDZ), "for ... preventing attacks 
on the Korean Coast; securing the [U.N.] Command sea lanes of communica-
tions and preventing the introduction of contraband or entry of enemy agents 
into [the] Republic ofKorea.64 Paralleling the "Peace Line" proclaimed by ROK 
President Syngman Rhee earlier in 1952 to claim continental shelf and exclusive 
fishing rights for South Korea,65 the Clark Line was rescinded August 25,1953 
as part of the armistice negotiations.66 Although Professor O'Connell has asserted 
that the SDZ "was operationally successful because in the circumstances the law 
could be overlooked, ,,67 his position, taken in 1975, was not correct in 1952 
when the Clark Line was proclaimed, or today. As analyzed in the contexts of 
the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas war and the 1980-88 Tanker War, Parts ILF and 
ILG, such war zones are legal so long as they are limited in time and geographic 
scope proportional to the conflict. As sources for those conflicts illustrate, such 
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zones have a history of state practice going back to at least the Russo-Japanese 
War of 1904-05.68 And to the extent that the Clark Line area coincided with 
the Security Council decisions authorizing defense of Korea, the SDZ was legal 
for that reason as well.69 The geographic coincidence of the Rhee Line, which 
ran up to 200 miles off the ROK coasts and was primarily aimed at excluding 
fishermen from Japan, then emerging from postwar occupation,70 illustrates a 
problem common to the postwar world of relatively limited naval warfare and 
the seaward extensions of claims of national sovereignty, such as the exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ), or the continental shel£ 71 While it might be perfecdy 
valid for a state to reasonably regulate fishing and other economic activity 50 
miles off its coast, as North Korea has purported to do recendy, that nation's 
geographically coincident 50-mile defense exclusion zone clearly is not propor-
tional, in duration or area, relative to whatever threat(s) North Korea might 
perceive,72 and thus is illegal under international law. 
The Korean conflict also saw the genesis of another source oflaw for naval 
warfare. When the USSR returned to the Security Council and its vetoes 
throtded further Council action on the war, the General Assembly passed the 
"Uniting for Peace" Resolution (UFP) with the backing of the United States.73 
UFP in effect construed the Assembly's largely non-binding authority under the 
U.N. Charter74 to include recommendations to U.N. Members for further 
prosecution of the war. UFP was the legal vehicle for later Assembly-approved 
peacekeeping operations, most of which did not involve U.S. forces, and few 
of which involved naval units.75 The UFP process has been employed in 
situations outside the arena of armed conflict, often to the chagrin of the United 
States. In theory at least, UFP remains as a possible source of claims to the control 
of naval warfare. Two important products of the UFP process include the 1970 
General Assembly Resolution 2625, declaring principles offriendly relations and 
cooperation among states, and the 1974 Resolution 3314, defining aggression, 
both adopted by consensus?6 
(1) The Civil War in China 
During the same time, the U.S. Seventh Fleet had begun the Taiwan Straits 
Patrol to prevent the PRC from invading Taiwan or the Republic of China 
from invading the mainland as a corollary to the Korean conflict,77 rejecting 
USSR claims that this was an act of aggression and a blockade ofTaiwan?8 In 
1953 the United States changed the Patrol to a defensive shield for Taiwan 
because of PRC entry into the Korean War?9 Although no formal mutual 
defense treaty with Taiwan was ratified until 1954,80 the United States had 
retained its posture as a World War II ally of Nationalist China before then.81 
Thus U.S. naval forces could legitimately protect Taiwan's territorial integrity 
under a self-defense theory as long as Taiwan acquiesced in this form of limiting 
an ally's freedom of movement. 
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In 1949, the United Kingdom and the United States had protested the 
Republic of China's declared blockade of the China coast. Several U.S. and 
U.K. merchantmen were seized.82 The practice as to the United States stopped 
with advent of the Korean War and President Truman's statement directed 
toward the Taiwan government.83 Seizures of Soviet bloc vessels by Taiwan 
government ships occurred in 1953-54, for which the United States disclaimed 
responsibility,84 and U.K. ships also were molested up through 1953, for which 
Great Britain protested and declared that U.K. warships had been instructed "to 
afford protection to British ships on their lawful occasions on the high seas. ,,85 
From 1950 through 1953, there were 90 incidents of Nationalist Chinese 
interference with international shipping destined for PRC ports. Two thirds of 
these incidents involved U.K.-flag vessels. These ships were detained in 
Taiwanese ports and their cargoes confiscated.86 Nevertheless, James Cable has 
rated the Nationalists' operation "not very successful" from the standpoint of 
gunboat diplomacy.87 At the same time, PRC warships were successfully 
employing gunboat diplomacy against Japanese fishing vessels; 158 were seized 
between 1950 and 1954 "before Japanese fishermen agreed to respect Chinese 
prohibited zones. ,,88 South Korea employed the same practice from 1953 
through 1955. The 1958 PRC attack on the Quemoy and Matsu Islands close 
to the China mainland but held by the Taiwan government, prompted a U.S. 
response of 60 warships. "Smaller ships began escorting Nationalist convoys to 
the offihore islands. The PRC response was the issuance of a declaration 
extending China's territorial waters from 3 to 12 nautical miles, which applied 
to the coastal islands ... and all other islands claimed as Chinese territory. ,,89 
The United States, as a matter of policy, did not send its convoying warships 
into Quemoy/Matsu territorial waters, but it did not thus imply recognition of 
PRC claims to territorial seas around the islands.90 During the 1950s PRC PT 
boats developed the tactic of concealing themselves in PRC fishing fleets and 
darting out of this cover to attack Nationalist ships.91 Both the U.S. tactic of 
convoying and the PRC use offishing fleets to camouflage speedboats were later 
employed in the Tanker War. 
The United States could convoy Nationalist vessels to the offihore islands, 
and the convoys, if they carried goods that did not contribute to the Nationalist 
warfighting/war-sustaining effort, enjoyed legal immunity from attack. Even if 
vessels did carry goods to support the Nationalists' efforts to respond to a civil 
war, the United States could legitimately convoy them. Until 1979, the United 
States recognized Taiwan as the legitimate government of all China and had a 
self-defense arrangement with Nationalist China dating from World War 11.92 
Thus the United States, as a matter of self-defense,93 could have defended its 
escorting ships and any convoyed vessels from attack. 
Small coastal fishing boats engaged in their trade are exempt from capture or 
attack. However, if the boats aided and abetted the speedboats by concealing 
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them or otherwise assisting in their belligerent acts, the fishing craft lost their 
immunity.94 This issue was apparently never tested insofar as u.s. naval vessels 
were concerned, but several Nationalist vessels were hit, and there was response 
in kind. 
(2) Other Trends 
Writing just after the close of the Korean War, Professor Tucker confirmed 
the traditional rule that small coastal fishing and trade vessels, so long as they did 
. . . h cr: fr d d . 95 not partICipate In t e war euort, were exempt om capture an estructlOn, 
as did NWIP 10_2,96 the predecessor to NWP 9A. They followed the view of 
Oppenheim's current treatise, published in 1952.97 All authorities agreed that 
coastal steamers or relatively large, deep-draft vessels were not within the 
exception. 
Professors Oppenheim and Tucker, tracing the shift from the mid-eighteenth 
century, when the rule was that private enemy merchant ships might be 
captured, through the early twentieth century debate over capture, to the rule 
following World War II and the early Fifties, concluded that such vessels could 
not be captured, attacked and destroyed, with these exceptions: 
(1) A ship refused to stop when summoned to do so; 
(2) A ship actively resisted visit and search; 
(3) A ship sailed under convoy of military ships and/or aircraft; 
(4) A ship was armed with offensive weapons, and such have been used, were 
intended for use, against an enemy; 
(5) A ship was incorporated into or assisted the enemy's armed forces intelligence 
system; or 
(6) A ship acted as a naval or military auxiliary to enemy armed forces. 
The merchantman's passengers, crew and papers were to be placed in safety if 
circumstances permitted, and the attacking ship was required to look for 
survivors and to protect them and the dead against ill treatment if the ship were 
sunk. If a merchantman desired to surrender, the attacking vessel could not refuse 
quarter.98 NWIP 10-2 approved exclusion zones, stating that "[w]ithin the 
immediate vicinity of his forces, a belligerent commanding officer may exercise 
control over the communications of any neutral vessel ... whose presence might 
otherwise endanger the safety of his operations," and that "a belligerent may 
establish special restrictions ... upon the activities of neutral vessels ... and may 
prohibit altogether such vessels ... from entering the area. Neutral vessels ... 
[failing] to comply ... expose themselves to the risk of being fired upon.,,99 
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Professor Tucker, in whose Naval War College analysis appears the first edition 
of NWIP 10_2,100 says that war zones directed against enemy merchantmen not 
integrated into the war effort, or presumably otherwise not exempted (as being 
unarmed), would not justify a shoot-on-sight policy.l0l Tucker agreed with 
NWIP 10-2 that practice allowed controlling neutral vessel movements, and that 
merchantmen carrying contraband were subject to seizure.102 Oppenheim stated 
that war zone declarations warning neutrals of entry only at their peril were 
illegal. However, "[a]s between the belligerents only, provided that the zone is 
enforced by the use of means . . . which comply with the laws of maritime 
warfare, ... there can be no doubt of the lawfulness of the practice.,,103 
Although negotiated during the Korean War, the four Geneva Conventions 
of1949 did not come into effect for the United States until 1952. They are now 
generally effective worldwide.104 The Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition ofW ounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at 
Sea (GWSEA) is, in a sense, a misnomer, for its provisions apply, inter alia, to 
persons wounded, sick or shipwrecked who are "[m]embers of crews, including 
masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant marine ... of the Parties to the 
conflict, who do not benefit by more favorable treatment under any other 
provisions of international law."lOS An inference could be made that the 
negotiators would not have included all merchant seamen, including those 
aboard enemy merchant vessels, if they did not feel that all such ships were subject 
to attack under some circumstances, which had became the norm during World 
War 11.106 GWSEA also exempts small coastal rescue craft from attack. 107 
The last phrase of article 13(5) of GWSEA - "who do not benefit by more 
favorable treatment under any other provisions of international law" - invites 
attention to the growing body of human rights norms, typically encased in treaty 
format, but perhaps applicable today as general practice of states. lOS The first of 
these was the Genocide Convention,109 and there has been a veritable torrent 
of them since, some regional and some worldwide in application. To be sure, 
many human rights conventions contain "escape clauses" that render them 
largely inoperative during times of national emergency,110 e.g., armed conflict, 
but a future international tribunal might declare them articulative of a general 
customary standard, as the World Court did in the Nicaragua Case,111 perhaps 
ignoring the escape clause limitation. In general, future wars at sea may be largely 
free of these constraints, owing to the targeting of ships, not people, but it would 
seem that a national command authority ordering a war of genocidal extermina-
tion at sea, or an individual commander that directs execution of a rescued crew 
with genocidal intent, would be as guilty of violating human rights norms as of 
violating the law of armed conflict. Existence of this body of human rights law 
at least creates the expectation that claims of such violations will be made in 
future armed conflicts at sea.112 
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The 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention 113 may also impact armed 
conflict at sea. The United States is not party to this convention, although about 
80 nations are. Although the primary purpose of the Convention was protection 
of sites and immoveable and moveable property on land as a response to the 
Nazis' looting of Europe during World War II,114 there are implications for 
naval warfare. If a belligerent that is party to the Convention decides to transport 
cultural property, that state must apply to the Commissioner General for Cultural 
Property appointed under the Convention, who consults with the Protecting 
Powers for each belligerent on measures for specifically protected transport and 
who appoints inspectors to determine that only cultural property is being shipped 
in accordance with approved measures. Parties to the Convention pledge to 
"refrain from any act of hostilities, directed against transport under special 
protection." The ship must display a special emblem, a pentagonal blue and 
white shield.115 In "urgent cases," particularly at the start of armed conflict, a 
belligerent may "As far as possible notif[y] ... Parties," but the pentagonal shield 
may not be displayed unless other belligerents expressly grant immunity. Other 
belligerents must "take, so far as possible, the necessary precautions to avoid acts 
of hostility directed against [the transporting ship if it displays] the distinctive 
emblem.,,116 If either method is employed, the property and the carrying ship 
. fr . I··· 117 I ffc nl h are Immune om seIzure, p acmg In pnze, or capture. n e ect, u ess t ere 
is advance consent for emergency transfer, there would be a high risk of attack, 
even if there is a shield displayed or other notice given. The dilemma for the 
naval commander would be a decision whether the transporting vessel was 
employing a perfidious ruse or whether it was in fact carrying only cultural 
property. In any event, the Convention guarantees the right of visit and search 
of ships operating under both kinds of transport. lIS The Convention also 
generally excepts from its operation cases of "imperative" "military necessity" 
for such time as that necessity continues.H9 Immunity may also be withdrawn 
by a belligerent ifits opponent violates the requirement that the cultural property 
not be employed for military purposes,120 e.g., transporting valuable cultural 
property to pledge it for purchase of war material. If a Commissioner has been 
appointed, he or she must be notified of either kind of withdrawal from 
. . 121 Immumty. 
As in the case of the human rights conventions, nonratifying nations may find, 
after the fact, that the Convention articulates customary law norms,122 particular-
ly if the state is party to a similar regional agreement such as the Roerich Pact,l23 
which covers the same ground for certain Western Hemisphere nations, includ-
ing the United States. At the least, there can be expectations of claims of 
violations of international law from Convention parties. The Convention applies 
among parties bound by it, even though a co-belligerent is not bound by it. A 
co-belligerent may declare its acceptance of the Convention for the conflict, 
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and all are then bound so long as the nonparty co-belligerent adheres to the 
Convention's tenns.124 
B. Arab-Israeli Conflicts: 1948-57, 1967, 1973, 1982 
On May 15, 1948, toward the opening of the first conflict, Egypt instituted 
shipping inspections at Alexandria, Port Said and Suez, the latter two being entry 
ports for the Suez Canal. A May 18 proclamation provided that "munitions or 
merchandise of any kind destined directly or indirectly to the institutions or 
persons residing in Palestine" might be confiscated in accordance with interna-
tionallaw. (Israel had been proclaimed a state that day.) 125 On May 29 the U.N. 
Security Council called upon all governments to refrain from introducing 
fighting personnel, or importing or exporting war material into or to the area 
during a ceasefire.126 AJune 3 notice applied the May 18 proclamation to Israeli 
exports. On July 8 Egypt established a prize court.127 Egypt further decreed 
search and seizure procedures, and published a contraband list, "including arms 
and armaments, chemicals, fuels, armed forces automobiles, and bullion," on 
February 6, 1950. On November 28, 1953, the list was expanded to include 
foodstuffi and "other commodities likely to strengthen the war potential" of 
Israel. The decree applied to vessels in Egyptian territorial waters or the Canal.128 
On November 14,1948 Egypt detained the U.S.-flag S.S. Flying Trader on 
grounds that it was transporting war materials. Trader's cargo included 4000 bags 
of rice, an ingot of tin and 38 "trucks." The rice was released; the fate of the tin 
is unknown.129 The Egyptian prize court later said the "trucks" were "in fact 
guns, etc. [, i.e.] ... armored cars each capable of carrying a dozen soldiers." 
Trader had received the vehicles in Bombay; they were part of a consignment 
of 50 originally sent on Trader's sister ship, S.S. Flying Arrow, from the United 
States to Tel Aviv. Twelve vehicles were offioaded at Tel Aviv before the war 
began, but more could not be discharged because of attacks in this port. Arrow 
then proceeded to Bombay, India, where the 38 vehicles were transshipped to 
Trader, which sailed for New York via Genoa, Italy, a port allegedly "a principal 
base for contraband traffic destined for" Israel. Genoa was on the Egyptian 
blacklist of ports. Trader was stopped at Port Said. Two bills oflading for the 
vehicles were offered to the court, the original "to order" and a copy naming 
an individual. The vehicles were condemned as lawful prize.130 Perhaps equally 
important was the prize court's ruling that the seizure was legal despite con-
clusion of a General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel before the 
seizure.131 Although this aspect of the holding has been criticized,132 the Trader 
case is illustrative of the potential for legal approval of claims to commit "warlike" 
acts while there is a technical "peace.,,133 
The United States protested Egypt's oil tanker regulations requiring a ship to 
certify it was heading for a neutral port and to obtain an Egyptian certificate that 
the cargo was for local consumption in a neutral port in late 1950. The Egyptian 
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regulations also provided that if a tanker did not comply, it would be denied 
facilities. The protest "stated that these regulations would work undue hardship 
on normal shipping operations" and reserved the right to protest on legal 
grounds. Egypt responded by blacklisting vessels whose manifests showed they 
had carried to Israel "any material considered contraband by ... Egypt.,,134 
The United Kingdom, on the other hand, had "compromised the position" 
of straits passage (through the Straits of Tiran) to the Israeli port of Eilat 
by agreeing to contraband search at Adabiya or Suez, a" concession to belligeren-
cy ... to prevent hostilities from spilling over on to the high seas, but the British 
agreement carried with it the implication of a recognition that Egypt had 
belligerent rights, and it claimed no reservation as to rights of passage through 
the straits." 135 Although Egypt claimed the United States and Denmark had also 
acquiesced in such searches,136 the record is less than clear but would indicate 
that the United States protested some, if not all, of the Egyptian procedures, and 
that probably Denmark did too.137 Indeed, after an Egyptian corvette stopped, 
plundered and damaged a U.K. merchantman on July 1, 1951 in the Gulf of 
Aqaba as part of the attempted blockade ofIsrael, and British protests and Security 
Council discussion were unavailing, a British destroyer flotilla was sent to the 
Red Sea "to prevent further incidents of this kind." On July 26, Egypt and 
Britain reached agreement on future procedures for U.K. ships. From late 1951 
to March 1952 British warships - usually two cruisers - were employed to keep 
the Canal open when Egyptian labor was withdrawn and clearance was denied 
U.K. vessels. The cruisers provided a protected labor force to keep the Canal 
til E d · 138 open un gypt resume operattons. 
After the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission reported its belief 
that it did not have the right to ask Egypt to stop interfering with goods passage 
through the Canal,139 the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution on 
September 1, 1951, finding that Egypt's interference with neutral shipping's 
passage was "an abuse of the right of visit, search and seizure" that could not be 
justified on the basis of self-defense and was a violation of freedom of the seas. 
The Council called upon Egypt to end the restrictions.140 The resolution went 
unsupported,141 and the result was more seizures and protests.142 A second 
Council resolution was vetoed by the USSR in 1954.143 Professor O'Connell 
has inquired whether the 1951 resolution applied to the Gulf of Aqaba. 144 After 
Egypt nationalized the Canal, Israel's 1956 attack on Egypt, a ceasefire and 
establishment of the U.N. Emergency Force, the Canal was reopened under 
management of the Suez Canal Users' Association with right of passage guaran-
teed.145 From February - April 1957, U.S. destroyers had patrolled the Straits 
ofTiran to successfully prevent Egyptian interference with U.S. merchantmen 
bound for Israel. Other U.S. naval vessels evacuated U.S. citizens and "friendly 
nationals," on a space-available basis, from Haifa and Alexandria.146 
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Dr. von Heinegg has summarized the decisions of the Egyptian prize courts 
from 1949 through the Fifties: 
... [T]he Egyptian prize court in its jurisdiction very often referred to the decisions 
of prize courts of the two World Wars. Whereas in a number of cases neutral 
cargo was released, the principle that a neutral flag covers enemy cargo was 
acknowledged only if the neutral did not cooperate with the enemy. Enemy 
destination was assumed in conformity with, e.g., British prize jurisdiction of the 
two World Wars, black lists playing an important role. All goods labelled "Produce 
ofIsrael" were considered to be of enemy character. The notion of contraband 
was interpreted extensively comprising, e.g., tea, coffee, onions, [and] spices. 
The judgments of the Egyptian prize court bore a strong resemblance to the prize 
jurisdiction of the two World Wars. It is, however, remarkable that all ships and 
goods affected had been captured in Egyptian ports. Partly the goods had been 
unloaded before the outbreak of hostilities in 1948. In the ... Inge Toft the court 
expressly indicated that Egypt did not exercise its rights on the high seas but 
restricted itself to territorial waters and ports. Even though the Security Council 
in September 1951 [had] characterized the Egyptian practice as an "abuse of the 
exercise of the right of visit, search and seizure Egypt more or less regularly 
maintained it until the conclusion of the peace treaty of 1979.147 
In 1949 an armistice to the first round of fighting had been declared, and it was 
in response to this that the Security Council in Resolution 95 had declared that 
Egypt had indulged in "an abuse of the right of visit, search and capture;" Egypt 
considered the armistice ended due to Israeli "aggressions," including a high seas 
attack on Karim, an Arab vessel.148 The important point is that the precedent of 
seizing ships during an armistice was deemed legal by Egypt,149 although 
denounced by the Security Council, when there was an alleged breach of the 
armistice. The Council had made no "decision" requiring U.N. Members to 
assist in ending the seizures, as it had during the Korean conflict. ISO The second 
point is that Inge Tift does not indicate that Egypt felt compelled, as a matter of 
international law, to limit its seizures to its territorial waters: 
... The United Arab Republic does not exercise her rights of belligerency on 
the high seas, but limits herself to exercising them within the confines of her 
territory, ports and territorial waters. Article 10 of the [Constantinople] Conven-
tion of October 29, 1888 [governing use of the Suez Canal], gives Egypt the right 
to take all necessary measures for the maintenance of public order in time of peace 
and for her defence in time of war. It is natural that the requirements of such 
protection are left entirely to the United Arab Republic, just as are the require-
ments oflegitimate self-defence. The policy of the economic boycott ofIsrael has 
been part of the public order of the United Arab Republic since 1948. To 
renounce this ?olicy would be to compromise this public order in all the Arab 
and Islamic States.151 
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The case should not be read as lending support to the questionable view that 
belligerent naval operations, which may include seizure of merchantmen, can 
be conducted only near the belligerents' coasts.152 
Although Israel attempted to characterize the seizures as a blockade, and 
therefore violative of the 1888 Constantinople Convention's prohibition of such 
in the Canal, the Egyptian actions were not, technically, that form of interdic-
tion. During the Security Council debate on the seizure, Egypt asserted in 1951 
that they had been relatively few in number and were essential if the nation were 
to "survive.,,153 This seems to be a vague reformulation of a claim of the right 
of anticipatory self-defense - i.e. seizure of war material before it could be used 
against Egypt - qualified by the principles of necessity and proportionality154 that 
Egypt had asserted in earlier Security Council debates.155 In any event, the 
Council condemned such actions in its September 1,1951 resolution.156 
In the 1967 Six Day War, Egyptian submarines sank two innocent Greek 
freighters in the Mediterranean Sea, one off Alexandria and the other further 
west in the Mediterranean.157 A sidebar aspect of this war was a U.K. statement 
that it would join with other nations to assure right of passage through the Straits 
ofTiran. A British carrier group and the U.S. Sixth Fleet were concentrated in 
the Eastern Mediterranean, but "[t]his threat of purposeful force ... was not 
pursued and ... did more harm than good to British and American interests." 
The U.S.S. Liberty, which was monitoring Israeli transmissions during the 
Egyptian phase of the war, was damaged in an attack by Israeli PT boats, for 
which compensation was paid to the United States by Israel for loss of life and 
injuries among the crew and for damage to Liberty, without admission of fault. 
Liberty was configured like a merchant cargo ship but £lew the U.S. ensign, was 
painted haze grey like all U.S. warships in the Mediterranean Sea, and had 
traditional pendant numbers on the bow and stem. Israel had declared a very 
imprecise exclusion zone, warning all ships to keep away from "the coasts of 
Israel during darkness." As to what coasts were meant (e.g., conquered territory 
also?) was less than clear. There was also an informal, private warning to the 
United States. As Commander Jacobsen has analyzed it, the public exclusion 
zone as a matter of law failed because of vagueness; in any event, the attack 
occurred in daylight (2 p.m.). The second, privately-warned zone was not 
legitimate either because it was not publicly announced in such a manner that 
Liberty would have been aware of the risk.158 Although Liberty was a warship,159 
if she had been a merchantman, the same result would have obtained as to the 
legality of the attack so long as the ship was not engaged in work that assisted a 
belligerent, e.g., gathering intelligence. The attack on the Liberty might be 
contrasted with the sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat, a warship of one of the 
belligerents, during a resumption of hostilities in October 1967. During the next 
month, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 242 which "Affiml[ed] 
further . . . the necessity for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through 
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international waterways in the area, .. 160 which undoubtedly meant the Suez 
Canal but may have included the Gulf of Aqaba. 161 
During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, international shipping was warned about 
entering the region of conflict, which first comprised Egyptian and Israeli 
territorial waters, but later further parts of the sea plus Egyptian, Libyan and 
Syrian ports. In October 1973 the Syrian navy captured and diverted a Greek 
liner, Romantica, but released her the next day after the Italian ambassador 
intervened. No furth~r such incidents occurred, perhaps because ofinternational 
protests, although Egypt regularly stopped, visited and searched neutral mer-
chantmen. Third states' reactions varied: African nations unilaterally suspended 
or terminated diplomatic relations with Israel; Arab nations boycotted oil exports 
to Israel and the United States; Great Britain embargoed arms, largely affecting 
Israel; except for Portugal, other West European nations refused to allow use of 
their territories for supply or assistance to any belligerent, thereby cutting down 
the black-list potential of the 1948-57 war. Arab navies adopted the tactic of 
taking shelter beside merchant ships in their harbors after firing missiles at Israeli 
warships. Egypt declared a blockade in the Red Sea and attacked but missed an 
Israeli-bound tanker. In the Gulf of Suez, Egypt acted to blockade the Abu 
Rudiers-Eilat route used by Israeli-chartered tankers carrying oil from the 
Israeli-occupied Sinar fields to Eilat. In response to Egypt's blockade of the Straits 
ofBab el Mandeb, Israel counter-blockaded the area.162 The rationale of Egypt 
in the Bab el Mandeb operation was obscure: 
blockade was maintained in the Straits of Bab el Mandeb. Whether this was 
conducted by units of the Egyptian navy or not was apparendy deliberately 
obscured, perhaps because the Egyptian government had not made up its mind 
whether the appropriate concept was that of distant blockade ofIsrael as an enemy 
with whom Egypt was at war; or the exercise of belligerent rights in the territorial 
seas of an allied State engaged in a collective self-defence operation; or the right 
of a coastal State (in this case Southern Yemen) to close its territorial seas to 
enemy-destined traffic, even though the territorial seas lie within straits. Egypt's 
only official announcement on the subject referred to the 'legitimate right of the 
Republic of South Yemen', which also by decree unilaterally asserted sovereignty 
over the seaway. South Yemen, with only two ex-Russian submarine chasers, 
two minesweepers and a total naval complement of200 men, was in no position 
to prevent the passage of ships in the face of any resistance, and it seems that units 
of the Egyptian navy did, in fact, fire warning shells, visit and search foreign ships 
and warn off those bound for Israel. 
When the destroyer U.S.S. Charles Francis Adams intercepted the radio message 
of the S.S. LA Salle, a U.S.-flag merchantman, that she was being fired on in the 
Straits, Adams' sailing was delayed by French authorities until such time as LA 
Salle had turned back to Massawa, Ethiopia. A U.S. Seventh Fleet task force 
entered the Indian Ocean from the Pacific, and was believed to have orders to 
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protect American neutral traffic in the Straits. This ended the blockade, at least 
insofar as U.S.-flag shipping was concerned.163 The naval war had no decisive 
influence on the final outcome of the conflict.164 The 1979 Egypt-Israel peace 
treaty, ending the 1973 war, provided that Israeli ships, and cargoes coming to 
or from Israel, enjoyed free passage rights through the Suez Canal and its 
approaches on the basis of the Constantinople Convention,165 which had 
internationalized the Canal. Israeli nationals, vessels and cargoes, as well as 
persons, vessels and cargoes going to or from Israel, would be given non-dis-
criminatory treatment in use of the Canal. Egypt and Israel declared the Straits 
of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba "open to all nations for unimpeded and 
non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight." They also agreed to 
respect the other's right to these rights in the Straits and the Gu1£166 A protocol 
recognized the rights of vessels of the parties to innocent passage through the 
other's territorial waters "in accordance with the rules of international law." 167 
During the 1982 campaign in Lebanon, Israel imposed a naval blockade on 
the Lebanese coast to prevent weapons from reaching the Palestine Liberation 
Organization, then based in Lebanon.16B Any ships or boats running guns to the 
PLO were subject to interdiction, capture and condemnation or destruction 
under the traditional rules of blockade. Weapons have always been considered 
absolute contraband.169 
(1) Trends in the Arab-Israeli Conflicts 
The 1948, 1973 and 1982 conflicts saw the declaration of traditional close-in 
blockades, with the typical problems of visit, search and capture.170 The eventual 
result of the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty was recognition ofIsrael's right to 
use the Suez Canal, internationalized by the 1888 Constantinople Convention, 
a further limitation on the opportunity to visit, search and capture mer-
chantmen.171 
Various high seas attacks by Egypt on neutral freighters were clearly illegal 
under international law, 172 as was the Israeli attack on the Liberty, a U.S. Navy 
warship marked as such.173 The high seas attacks by Egypt on neutral mer-
chantmen was an ominous portent of things to come in the Tanker War. 
(2) Other Trends 
During these conflicts the four 1958 law of the sea treaties were negotiated 
and have come into force. 174 All save the 1958 Fisheries and Conservation 
Convention have been accepted as restatements of customary law.175 
The 1958 High Seas Convention in particular has provisions that relate to 
this study. It declares that the high seas are "open to all nations, [and] no State 
may validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of 
the high seas is exercised under [the Convention] and by the other rules of 
international law," e.g., the law of armed conflict. Thus as between belligerents, 
the convention would be modified by the law of naval warfare. However, 
non-belligerents can claim rights under the Convention, except insofar as the 
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law of war affects them, e.g., exclusion zones. The Convention does state the 
rights of freedom of navigation and freedom of fishing, but these and others 
"recognized by the general principles of international law," must be exercised 
by states "with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise 
of the freedom of the high seas.,,176 The Territorial Sea Convention provided 
for a contiguous zone as part of the high seas to allow littoral states to police 
such an area for, e.g., smugglers, but the negotiators did not include any 
• • fc h·d . 177 prOVIsIons or s oreSI e secunty zones. 
All states have the right to sail ships under their flag, to fix conditions for 
granting nationality to ships, for registering ships, and for flying tile flag. 
However, "there must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship," e.g. 
effective jurisdiction and control of the flag state in administrative, technical and 
social matters over ships flying its flag. 178 The latter provision responded to the 
flag of convenience phenomenon.179 Warships and vessels owned or operated 
by a state and "used only on non-commercial service" have complete immunity 
except for the flag state.180 States must prevent oil pollution or the release of 
radioactive waste from ships.181 The 1958 Fisheries and Conservation Conven-
tion reaffirms the above-stated right to fish on the high seas, but adds that states 
must adopt or cooperate in adopting conservation measures for the seas' living 
resources.182 The influential Restatement (Second), Foreign Relations LAw if the 
United States adopted the genuine link theory in 1964;183 it did not address 
directly the sovereignty and navigation issues.184 Professor Wolfrum has inter-
preted the 1960 decision of the International Court of Justice concerning the 
membership of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization 
(1M CO, now IMO, the International Maritime Organization) to imply that only 
registration, and not the "genuine link" postscript to Article 5 of the High Seas 
Convention, governed for nationality of vessels.18S He concludes that "the right 
of each State to establish its own conditions for the grant ofits flag is not limited 
by international law. Consequently, no State may challenge or refuse to 
recognize the registration of ships by another State. Moreover, no State has the 
right to look behind a ship's flag.,,186 
Prominent treatise writers of the time generally approved the traditional rules 
applicable to enemy merchant ships. Professor McDougal and Florentino 
Feliciano in 1961 summarized the exceptions for protected vessels such as 
hospital ships and small coastal fishing boats, but that "in the practice of both 
sides in [World War II], merchantmen were in fact regarded as regular com-
batants and subjected to sinking at sight.,,187 Although one later commentator 
has said McDougal and Feliciano equate the law of war zones with the law of 
blockade188 - as applied to neutrals - it is reasonably clear that McDougal and 
Feliciano would approve war zone treatment for enemy merchant ships,189 the 
object of this study. Therefore, the legitimacy of attack on enemy merchantmen 
- subject to the usual protection and exclusions - would apply to war zone 
, 
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situations too. McDougal and Feliciano also preserve the distinction between 
neutrals carrying contraband, which in their view would be subject to capture 
and condemnation of the goods.190 There was apparently no analysis of the 
problem of war-sustaining cargo aboard neutral vessels. 
C. John Colombos came to the same conclusions in 1967, noting 11 
exceptions, among them protected vessels such as hospital ships, or small coastal 
fishing or trading boats when not used for military operations, stating that enemy 
character must be determined by the flag flown.191 Destruction of the enemy 
merchant ship required that all on board be placed in safety and that the ship's 
papers be removed and preserved. Since it was difficult under modem warfare 
conditions to accomplish this, "destruction must be treated as an exceptional 
measure." Colombos acknowledged, however, that NWIP 10-2 and World War 
II practice by France, Great Britain, Italy and the United States permitted 
destruction in case of military necessity when the merchantman could not be 
captured and sent or escorted in for adjudication. Capture was seen as the normal 
modality for neutrals carrying contraband; there is no clear statement concerning 
attack and destruction of a contraband carrier, but if the merchantman was 
integrated into the war effort, World War II practice and NWIP 10-2 would 
permit destruction. The capturing officer had the duty of taking all possible 
measures to provide for the safety of passengers, crew and ship's papers.192 
Colombos also seemed to approve a measure of control over the high seas by 
belligerents for their own protection, provided they could control the area.193 
In 1968, Professor Mallison traced the history of the law of naval warfare on 
capture or destruction of enemy merchant vessels and approved the NWIP 10-2 
list,194 but added: 
The provisions of this article are accurate as far as they go but are inadequate in 
covering this one particular situation. During the past general wars enemy cargo 
ships were attacked without warning even if they did not participate otherwise in 
the enemy war effort. They were attacked without warning because they were 
cargo vessels carrying cargoes of military importance. There is, unfortunately, no 
reason to believe that such cargo ships which comply rigorously with the 
requirements of Article S03(b)(3) will be immune from attack without warning 
in future general wars. This article, however, could provide specific grounds for 
claims and counterclaims based upon charges of illegality. If this occurs, the next 
steps could involve the invocation of reprisals and counter-reprisals so that a future 
general war could be conducted, thereafter, without regard to this article of the 
LAw oj Naval Warfare. 
Professor Mallison also recognized the traditional list of vessels immune from 
capture or attack - e.g., hospital ships and coastal fishing or trading boats.195 
Although primarily concerned with attacks on neutrals in war zones, he declared 
that attacks on enemy merchantmen in declared war zones was and would be 
legal, subject to the usual exceptions, e.g., hospital ships, etc. The rule on neutral 
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ships integrated into the enemy war effort was that they should be treated like 
h hi 196 enemy merc ant s ps. 
Writing in 1962, Professor McDougal and his associates noted that the law 
of naval warfare, conditioned by the norms of the U.N. Charter, was an 
exception to the general principles of freedom of navigation of the seas.197 They 
severely criticized the genuine link theory of the 1958 High Seas Convention.198 
C. Other Merchant Ship Interdictions and Diversions, 1956-66 
From 1956 through 1966, other incidents involving merchant ship interdic-
tion occurred without conflict erupting on the high seas, although there was 
sometimes parallel fighting on land. 
(1) The Civil War in Algeria 
During the civil war in Algeria, the French navy sought to visit and search 
ships that were suspected of running war materials to the rebels in Algeria. France 
declared a 20 to 50 kilometer (11-28 mile) customs zone off Algeria for small 
craft.199 High seas interceptions occurred off Algeria but also 45 miles off 
Casablanca, in the Atlantic Ocean, and in the English Channel, far from the high 
seas adjacent to Algeria. In 1956, 4775 vessels were visited; 1330 were searched; 
192 were re-routed, i.e., diverted; and 1 was arrested. Diversion was ordered if 
weather made boarding impossible, if the cargo's nature was such that a thorough 
at-sea search could not be conducted, or if cargo was arms, ammunition and 
explosives. Ships flying flags of a dozen nations were involved, and the flag states 
protested vigorously. France justified her actions on self-defense grounds.2OO 
Although a large-scale operation, the French interdiction program did not 
seriously affect freedom of navigation, since those few ships whose cargoes were 
seized were clearly engaged in smuggling arms to Algeria.201 Compensation was 
paid for some vessels wrongfully detained?02 Although some arms were im-
ported directly from the seas off the Algerian coast, others were brought in 
overland through Morocco, Tunisia or Libya. In some instances arms were sent 
to a third state, e.g., Egypt or Libya, and then transported through another 
country, e.g., Tunisia, and across the Algerian border. In some cases, states 
friendly to the rebels were buying vessels, vesting nominal ownership in 
third-country nationals, for the traffic. In other cases, bogus shipping documents 
were used. Some arms were smuggled in by fishermen?03 
(2) The Iceland-United Kingdom Cod War 
In 1958-59 British warships escorted and protected British trawlers fishing in 
waters claimed as territorial sea by Iceland. Great Britain eventually withdrew 
from the "Cod War," and the issue was resolved by diplomacy?04 
(3) The Cuban Quarantine 
In 1962 the United States, acting in concert with other Western Hemisphere 
states under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), 
imposed a maritime quarantine against Soviet introduction of missiles, components 
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and delivery systems, into Cuba. The action was claimed to be proper under 
Article 52 of the U.N. Charter, which allows interim security arrangements such 
as the Rio Treaty. The quarantine was undoubtedly legal under Article 52 of 
the Charter. The U.S. presidential proclamation establishing the quarantine, 
besides citing the Rio Treaty-based resolution, also relied on a U.S. Congres-
sional resolution that recognized the threat. The U.S. proclamation was specific 
as to the type of cargoes to be halted, e.g., missiles, bombs, bomber aircraft, 
warheads, and support equipment, "and any other classes of material hereafter 
designated by the Secretary of Defense [to] effectuate" the proclamation. The 
proclamation exempted other cargoes, e.g., foodstuffi and petroleum, and 
declared neutral rights would be respected. No blockade was declared, and the 
proclamation limited use of force to situations where directions under the 
quarantine were disobeyed if reasonable efforts had been made to communicate 
directions to an interdicted vessel, "or in case of self-defense." (The Rio Treaty 
authorized "partial or complete interruption of economic relations or of ... sea 
... communications; and use of armed force[,]" among other measures, thus 
paralleling the language of Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter.) Some commen-
tators have seen the quarantine as a self-defense measure, pure and simple.2os 
Self-defense as a proper rationale for the quarantine after the Nicaragua Case has 
been questioned, although the possible limited precedential value of that case 
should be noted?06 Moreover, to the extent that action was taken under Article 
52 of the Charter, as noted by the United States and others, the Nicaragua Case, 
which dealt with the parallel customary right of self-defense alongside Article 
51, the case carries even less weight. Moreover, no one would question the right 
of individual and collective self-defense, e.g., under customary law or Article 51 
of the Charter, if a warship maintaining the quarantine had been attacked by, 
e.g., a Soviet warship, while enforcing the quarantine or in other circumstances, 
e.g., in the Pacific Ocean. 
(4) The Rhodesian Interdiction Operation 
In 1965-66, as part of the transition of governance from Southern Rhodesia 
to independent Zimbabwe, the U.N. Security Council passed a series of 
resolutions denouncing the white Rhodesian government as illegal, and calling 
upon all states to refrain from assisting the white minority regime and to institute 
an oil embargo, and upon the United Kingdom in particular to enforce such 
an embargo?07 H.M.S. Berwick, on patrol off Beira, a Mozambican port 
employed for offioading oil bound for Rhodesia, stopped and visited S.S. Joanna, 
an inbound Greek tanker, which refused to divert from Beira. Because the 
operative Council resolution spoke only in terms of embargo and not blockade 
or similar measures, Berwick had to let Joanna enter Beira. A later resolution 
specifically authorized such action, and the next blockade-runner, Manuela, was 
diverted after boarding. Oil companies and tanker owners began to supply lists 
of innocent tankers manifested for Beira, and except for one French tanker 
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(Artois) not on the list but in fact innocent, the system worked well. "[O]utsiders 
as possible blockade-runners ... did not reappear. ,,208 When France protested 
H.M.S. Minerva's signalling "Stop or I will fire," and then shooting one round 
across Artois' bow, the U.K. response was that Minerva was acting in accordance 
with Council Resolution 221.209 The Council also passed a series of decisions 
under Chapter VII of the Charter beginning in 1966 "which imposed" 
economic and other sanctions on Rhodesia; those were not terminated until 
1979 when Zimbabwe majority rule was assured.210 
(5) The Trends 
The seaward aspects of the Algerian civil war developed the concept of 
diversion of merchantmen to other ports, away from their destinations in 
rebel-held parts of Algeria, rather than the traditional visit, search and capture 
procedure. The customs zone idea was not new and roughly parallelled the 
exclusion zones under World War II and earlier practice. The high seas 
interdictions far from Algeria, justified by France on self-defense grounds, came 
close to the line of an international law violation, if they did not cross over into 
illegality. Under today's standards of proportionality, 211 and in view of contem-
porary protests, such actions were probably illegal, given the localized nature of 
the conflict. 
The U.K. Cod War convoying continued the trend oflegitimating peacetime 
convoying of a nation's own vessels to protect them against assaults by others, a 
theme that had been restated during the civil war in China and later during the 
Tanker War of 1980_88.212 
The 1962 Cuban Crisis started another trend for maritime naval operations, 
use of a quarantine under Article 52 of the Charter, rather than employment of 
the more traditional declaration of blockade, which carries with it a connota-
tion ofwar.213 In reality, the Cuban quarantine continued the practice of the 
Algerian civil war of a proportional exclusion zone, but in an international 
confrontation situation as distinguished from the internal conflict circumstances 
of civil war. 
The Rhodesian transition was the second example of use of the agency 
principle to effect control of merchant ship traffic by the U.N. Security Council, 
the first being Korea.214 Employment of diversion instead of traditional visit, 
search and capture followed the Algerian civil war model, but this time in the 
context of a U.N.-approved action. 
D. India-Pakistan: 1965, 1971 
During the first of these wars, Pakistan seized 50 Indian cargoes on neutral 
ships and adjudicated them before a prize court. The cargoes consisted mainly 
of tea, with some manifests of coal and general cargo; the High Court of Dacca 
held that because the tea was "produce of Indian soil," grown by Indian 
companies, it was lawful prize.215 Pakistan had previously published lists of 
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absolute and conditional contraband; India responded with a list of absolute 
contraband. India asserted that because a fonnal state of war did not exist, 
Pakistan could not constitute a prize court. Pakistan responded that the maritime 
measures were a lawful exercise of the right of sel£..defense under the U.N. 
Charter.216 India's ultimate response to the initial Pakistani seizure was im-
poundment of three Pakistani ships in Indian waters and ordering offloading 
contraband before proceeding to Pakistan as "reprisals." When Pakistan con-
tinued to offload cargoes in neutral bottoms bound for India, India infonned 
foreign shipping companies that no India-bound cargoes should be shipped in 
Pakistani-flag vessels and that neutral-flag vessels bound for either nation should 
stop first at an Indian port, despite a cease-fire in effect. If the cargo was not 
contraband, it would not be seized. Thirty-eight vessels complied; 16 did not. 
After the end of contraband control by both belligerents, they first agreed to 
permit U.S. aid vessels to land their cargoes. Eventually both states heeded the 
International Federation ofInsurance's request for release of neutral vessels.217 
Late in 1966, the U.N. General Assembly belatedly called upon the belligerents 
to observe the rules of warfare.218 Under the traditional view of Charter law, 
the resolution was nonbinding, although it was some evidence of the interna-
. al . ,. 219 non commuruty s VIews. 
In the 1971 war, India successfully isolated East Pakistan Qater Bangladesh) 
by "contraband control and blockade." After dark, neutral vessels were not 
allowed to approach the Pakistani coast closer than 75 miles. Besides ensuring 
safety of Indian vessels at sea through naval control and protection of shipping, 
the Indian Navy sought to capture or destroy Pakistani merchant vessels. More 
than 115 neutral ships were inspected, and India diverted neutral ships to Calcutta 
if they carried cargo of military significance, after India discovered that vessels' 
markings and names of many ships had been changed. Three Pakistani mer-
chantmen were captured.22o A Liberian-registered ship and a Spanish vessel were 
also sunk; Professor O'Connell has asserted that "[t]he naval operations con-
ducted by India against ... Karachi and on the Bay of Bengal took no account 
of international law, which was ... deliberately put to one side by the Indian 
naval staff." In these operations, two merchantmen were destroyed by surface-
to-surface missiles from Indian patrol boats while the ships were at anchor in the 
Karachi roadstead, i.e., in territorial waters. The neutral in-bound Venus Chal-
lengerwas hit and sunk by a missile 26.5 miles off Karachi and was lost with all 
hands; a Pakistani destroyer 20 miles off Karachi also went down to a Styx missile 
attack that night; the cause was probably "[c]apricious behavior of the missiles 
and malfunction or inadequate operation of the guidance systems. ,,221 Venus 
Challenger's destruction on the high seas was a classic case of indiscriminate use 
of weapons. Significantly, a week later, but apparently before the Pakistanis 
discovered her wreck, the Bengal Chamber of Commerce published its 40-mile 
dusk-to-dawn warning.222 Professor O'Connell was correct with respect to the 
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Venus Challenger; the Pakistani destroyer was fair game, however. On the other 
hand, the economic warfare aspects of the conflicts - visit, search, seizure, 
diversion, capture contraband and prize procedures - proceeded along traditional 
lines223 and thereby reinforced the traditional norms. The war was over in two 
weeks,224 thus ending the potential for a more significant trend in state practice 
on the issues. 
E. Vietnam: 1962-73225 
During the Vietnam conflict, North Vietnam employed small coastal fishing 
vessels as logistic craft to support its military operations226 in violation of the 
obligation to use these vessels, normally exempt from capture or destruction, for 
fishing only.227 The patrol areas developed for Operation Market Time, original-
ly part of a 12-mile defensive sea area, eventually extended to over 30 miles 
off the South Vietnamese coast.228 The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff considered 
a blockade of North Vietnam in 1965 but took Commander-in-Chief, 
Pacific's advice against such because it woul,d indicate the United States was 
performing a belligerent act.229 At the same time that the United States and 
South Vietnam (R VN) were intercepting southbound North Vietnamese 
supply boats, South Vietnamese were operating aJunk Force that was not part 
of its navy, also to prevent the very kinds of craft attempting to filter from the 
north. They performed other military tasks as well.23o In 1965 the Junk Force 
was integrated into the R VN Navy.231 The patrols did not interfere with local 
fishing and trading boats, even though Vietnam was not party to Hague 
Convention XI. 232 
The United States used Military Sealift Command ships, U.S.-flag charters, 
and occasionally foreign-flag vessels to deliver war materials. Several of these 
ships were attacked, and two were sunk, due to attacks by the Viet Cong while 
the ships were in South Vietnamese internal waters, i.e., during river transit. 
There seems to have been no discrimination between vessels carrying war 
material and civilian-oriented cargoes, e.g., cement.233 The United States did 
give antisubmarine protection to valuable cargoes, e.g., troop carriers.234 As it 
had done during the Korean War, the U.S. Navy evacuated refugees - over 
300,000 of them, mostly civilians - from North to South Vietnam, and 721 
French wounded, including prisoners of war, were taken aboard the hospital 
ship U.S.S. Haven, bound for Morocco and France.235 Soviet-flag vessels 
carrying war supplies to North Vietnam initially were not interdicted.236 In 1972 
a mine quarantine program in North Vietnamese territorial waters sought to seal 
off North Vietnamese ports;237 its antecedent had been an attempted quarantine 
by South Vietnam of Communist seaborne supplies coming to the Viet Cong 
through the Gulf of Siam and the Mekong Delta.238 A RVN destroyer did 
succeed in sinking a North Vietnamese trawler, believed to be carrying ammuni-
tion, in 1972, however.239 . 
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(1) Analysis of Trends 
Although the small-boat interdiction240 and the mine campaign have been 
justified,241 there is no evidence of North Vietnam's justification of its antiship 
interdiction campaign. If an interdicting ship's wake overturned a junk, a 
GWSEA issue of the duty to stop and pick up survivors would have arisen, 
according to Professor O'Connell.242 The civilian evacuations followed the same 
pattern as those of the Korean conflict, with at least media announcement of the 
process, and were justified under international law as a de facto cartel operation.243 
The hospital ship was also protected from attack,244 even though the United 
States was not in an international armed conflict at the time. 
(2) Other Incidents of the Era 
Two incidents involving naval force and merchant-type vessels occurred after 
the United States withdrew from Vietnam. 
On January 20-21, 1974, the PRC loaded 11 "warships" with 660 am-
phibious assault troops and took the disputed Paracel Islands in the South China 
Sea, fending off South Vietnamese naval gunfire with a superior naval force. 
Press reports indicated that the first PRC convoy, which was driven off by 
Vietnam, had been "fishermen" who had raised a PRC flag.24s 
The second was the Mayaguezincident, May 12-15,1975. Cambodian naval 
forces fired on and seized S.S. Mayaguez, a U.S.-flag unarmed merchantman in 
the Gulf of Thailand, 7-8 miles off an island claimed by Cambodia and Thailand 
but 60 miles off the coast of the mainland. Cambodia claimed Mayaguez was on 
a spy mission in her territorial waters. The United States asserted that the vessel 
was on a regular run between Hong Kong and Thailand and in the usual shipping 
lanes. The United States issued a Notice to Mariners, warning of the danger and 
intimating other incidents. U.S. Marine and Navy units cooperated to rescue 
the 40-member U.S.-national crew and the ship fromKoh Tang Island, 15 miles 
off Cambodia. After receiving small arms fire from Cambodian patrol boats and 
attempting to block Mayaguez' movement toward the mainland, U.S. carrier-
based aircraft had fired on and sunk three boats and damaged others. Because of 
the "profoundly negative" attitude of Communist states toward the ICJ, no 
possibility was seen for Cambodia's submission to the World Court, and that 
avenue of redress was not followed.246 
The convoy of "fishermen" aboard fishing craft was, of course, yet another 
example of misuse of a protected class of commercial ships. When these vessels 
were employed for the attack on the Paracels, they lost their protected status and 
could be treated like any warship.247 South Vietnam was legally justified in its 
attack. Moreover, one might question whether the vessels in question were local 
coastal craft, as contemplated by Hague Convention XI, since the Paracels are 
over 100 miles off the Asian mainland. 
The Cambodian seizure of Mayaguez also violated international law. The 
Cambodians had full opportunity to search for espionage evidence after they 
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boarded, and no report of such has been found. It is true that ships may use 
transit passage to the high seas in sea lanes that are in territorial waters, but the 
passage must be innocent in nature. Passage is innocent so long as it is not 
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state, and such 
nations may take steps to prevent passage which is not innocent, which may 
include temporary suspension if such is essential for the protection of the coastal 
state's security. In other respects, coastal states cannot hamper innocent pas-
sage.248 There was no showing of any danger to the security of Cambodia, nor 
was this a temporary suspension; it was an outright seizure. If the Cambodian 
action occurred outside territorial waters, in the contiguous zone as part of the 
h· h h . ·fi . fc • 11 ... 249 I . Ig seas, t ere was no Jusn canon or stoppmg lVlayaguez. twas appropnate, 
as a matter of international law, for the United States to respond proportionally 
to defend !'Jayaguez and to recover the crew and the ship. The incident illustrates 
the interplay of peacetime principles of maritime operations, today articulated 
in UNCLOS in addition to other treaties and customary law, and the law of 
anned conflict, i.e., the principles of self-defense. 
(3) Other Trends 
Treaty regimes concluded during or following the Vietnam conflict have 
affected the law of naval warfare tangentially. 
The 1971 Seabed Treaty's prohibitions on planting or placing nuclear 
weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the ocean floor250 in effect 
declares that enemy merchant ships may not be attacked by devices of that type, 
in that if the placement is illegal, then use would also be illegal. 251 Similarly, the 
1972 Bacteriological Convention's prohibition on development, production, 
stockpiling, acquiring or maintaining bacteriological agents or toxins252 impli-
cates their nonuse against enemy merchant ships.253 The 1972 Convention does 
not derogate from the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol;254 in effect, it "perfects the 
prohibition on the use of biological and toxin weapons begun in the 1925 
Protocol." Probably the 1972 Convention does not articulate customary law, 
but the 1925 Protocol does.255 "[T]here appears to be no role for biological 
ship-to-ship weapons,,256 at present, but the analysis has been included for the 
sake of trends in future naval weapons development and the law to accompany 
it. 
The 1977 Environmental Modification Convention parties have pledged 
"not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification 
techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of 
destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party." The range of the 
Convention includes the whole Earth.257 The Convention does not directly deal 
with the problem of an attack on a merchant vessel, being concerned with 
techniques that change the environment,258 but it would seem that a method of 
attack whose ultimate environmental effect might be construed as the impact 
desired, rather than the initial result on the object, would be within the scope 
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of the Convention. A torpedo attack on a tanker, which results in a large oil 
spill, the intent being to destroy the tanker, would not be denounced by the 
Convention. On the other hand, if the intent of the attack was to cause the spill 
so that enemy naval vessels' injection scoops, steam plant condensers or intakes 
to desalinization plants would become fouled, thereby causing engineering plant 
casualties and loss of movement capability, such action would be within the 
Convention if "widespread, long-lasting or severe" environmental effects also 
ensued. 
Negotiated with the law of land warfare, land-based air war and naval 
bombardment of land in mind,259 the 1977 Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions explicitly declares as much in Article 49(3).260 Nevertheless, the 
Protocol has strong overtones for objects of attack and methods and means of 
warfare that may influence the law of naval warfare.261 Some provisions explicitly 
refer to rules for naval warfare. The Protocol is not in force for the United States. 
Protocol I, Article 52, declares that civilian objects, which are all objects that 
are not military objectives as defined in the Protocol, shall not be the object of 
attack or reprisal; attacks must be limited strictly to "military objectives. . . . 
" [M]ilitary objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, 
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total 
or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstance ruling at the 
time, offers a definite military advantage." If there is doubt as to whether an 
object, normally thought of as civilian - e.g., "a place of worship, a house or 
other dwelling or a school" - is being used to effectively contribute to military 
action, the presumption is that it is not so used, according to Article 52.262 
This provision deserves close scrutiny. Its examples of places of worship, 
houses and schools demonstrate that it is clearly directed toward land warfare. 
However, there are maritime counterparts (e.g., passenger liners or cruise ships, 
houseboats, school ships or university research vessels). Is the phrase, "under the 
circumstances ruling at the time," appropriate for naval operations, given poor 
visibility and other identification conditions at sea, perhaps poor communica-
tions conditions among belligerents, and the present differences as to what is 
contraband? Should the presumption for civilian use in Article 52 be the same, 
or the reverse, perhaps coupled with a list of prohibited objects for which the 
presumption is as stated in Article 52 (e.g., hospital ships, other protected vessels, 
and passenger liners or cruise ships), and further demarcations through exclusion 
or war zones? 
Protocol I, Article 53 prohibits attacks on cultural objects, their use as part of 
the military effort, or the object of reprisals, without prejudice to the 1954 Hague 
Cultural Property Convention.263 For reasons noted in the Introduction, this 
aspect of the Protocol as customary law may have carryover effect for naval 
warfare, in that the Protocol reinforces other wartime treaty or customary 
264 norms. 
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Starvation of civilians as a warfare method is prohibited by Article 54(1). The 
remainder of the article would be largely inapplicable to sea warfare, except for 
the prohibition on attacks, destruction, removal orrenderinguseless offoodstuffi 
"indispensable to the survival of the civilian population," regardless of motive. 
The foregoing prohibition is inapplicable iffoodstuffi are solely for armed forces 
use or in direct support of military action. In no event can such actions leave 
the civil population without adequate food or water, such as to cause its starvation 
or forced movement.265 This aspect of Article 54 has obvious overtones for naval 
warfare in the context of what is and what is not contraband, and the issue of 
relief ships in general. 
Echoing the 1977 Environmental Modification Convention,266 Article 55(1) 
of Protocol I declares: 
Care shall be taken in warfirre to protect the natural environment against 
widespread,long-tenn and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition 
of the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected 
to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the 
health or survival of the population.267 
The same analysis for the Convention would appear to fit the Protoco1.268 Article 
56,269 denouncing attacks on dams, dikes or nuclear electric generating stations 
whose destruction would unleash "dangerous forces," is similar in theme but 
would seem to have little or no relevance to war at sea, unless a future treaty 
would denounce similar attacks on nuclear-powered merchant vessels or other 
bulk cargo ships whose burthen when released due to attack would unleash 
"dangerous forces." There are few if any nuclear-powered nonmilitary vessels 
in service today, even if one counts certain icebreakers as such, but liquid natural 
gas tankers might fall into this category. Article 56 also provides that parties to 
a conflict must try to avoid locating military objectives near works or installations 
that could loose dangerous forces. While this would seem to have no relevance 
for naval warfare, a parallel might be belligerents' sending ships with dangerous-
force potential to sea; they would be required to be kept away from legitimate 
military objectives, e.g., a military convoy, if a Protocol I analogue came into 
effect. 
The Protocol's precautionary measures chapter includes a specific provision 
for naval warfare: 
In the conduct of military operations at sea .•. , each Party to the conflict shall, 
in conformity with its rights and duties under the rules of international law 
applicable in armed conflict, take all reasonable precautions to avoid losses of 
civilian lives and damage to civilian objects. 
Article 57 also has general precautions to be observed for other attacks: 
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(a) Those who plan or decide upon an attack shall: 
(i) do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are 
neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection 
but are military objectives within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 52 
and that it is not prohibited by the provisions of this Protocol to attack them; 
(ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of 
attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental 
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects; 
(iii) refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected 
to cause incidental loss of civilian life.-injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to 
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated; 
(b) [A]n attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the 
objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack 
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage 
to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation 
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated; 
(c) [E]ffective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the 
civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit. 
Last, the Article provides that if a choice is possible between several military 
objectives for a similar military advantage, the commander must choose the 
objective that should cause the least danger to civilian lives and objectsPO 
Articles 57(2)(a)(iii) and 57(2) (b), together with Article 51 (5) (b), thus represent 
the first attempt at codification of the principle of proportionality,271 i.e., that 
the means of attack must not be such that incidental loss of civilian life, civilian 
injuries, or damage to civilian property, or a combination, cannot be excessive 
relative to the military advantage sought to be gained. 
Article 58 adds that belligerents must try to remove civilians or civilian objects 
from the vicinity of military objectives, avoid locating military objectives within 
or near densely populated areas, and take precautions to protect civil populations, 
individual civilians and civilian objects under their control against dangers of 
military operations.272 While all but the first-quoted clause of Articles 57 and 
58 apply to land warfare, certain implications may be seen to flow from the other 
provisions for war at sea. One obvious parallel is the principle for planning, 
deciding, cancelling and suspending attacks. The warning rule, if applied to naval 
warfare, would seem to contradict the customary rule of no warning for attack 
on enemy merchant ships if such ship is armed, is in an armed convoy, assists 
the enemy's intelligence system, acts as a naval auxiliary, or is integrated into the 
enemy's war-fighting/war-sustaining effort and the warning would subject an 
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attacking warship to imminent danger. (The customary rule requires - in the 
absence of these factors - that the enemy ship's passengers, crew and papers be 
placed in a position of safety before attack, but all this is subsumed under 
"waming."l73 The Article 57(c) principle would be congruent with naval 
warfare norms if the "circumstances do not pennit" exception clause would 
apply to situations where the merchantman is anned, etc., on the theory that 
such situations would subject the attacker to imminent danger. "Circumstances 
do not pennit" might easily include submarine attacks because of the nature of 
the modem submarine and its vulnerability on the surface. The same would also 
apply to aircraft attacking an anned enemy merchantman. 
The Article 58 requirement of removing civilians and civilian objects, if 
removal be equated with placing in safety, would appear to be at variance with 
the customary nonn. Protocol principles for choosing the military objective least 
damaging to civilian interests and for taking other necessary precautions to 
protect the civil population, etc., invite parallels for naval warfare. Article 58's 
requirement for locating military objectives away from densely-populated areas, 
if applied to naval warfare, would raise problems for siting naval bases in forward 
areas. There are relatively few decent natural harbors, etc., today that do not 
already have a port city nearby. 
The Protocol also bans indiscriminate attacks, which are: 
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective; 
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed 
at a specific military objective; or 
(c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot 
be limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are 
of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without 
distinction. 
The Protocol gives two examples of indiscriminate attacks: (1) use of a large 
weapon that destroys several separate discrete military targets at once when there 
are intervening civilian areas or civilian objects; (2) an attack that can be expected 
to cause excessive loss of civilians or civilian objects in relation to the "concrete 
d d· mili· d .. d ,,274 N al...r. al· . h b an Irect tary a vantage antICIpate . av wanare an ogIes mIg t e 
cruise missiles employed in a scenario where neutral merchant ships close aboard 
a target might be hit instead of the target (it being assumed no warnings to the 
merchantmen were given), or use of shipkilling weapons directed against a 
fleeing vessel suspected of violating protected status (e.g., a passenger ship 
suspected of carrying troops) when under the circumstances a partially disabling 
shot would serve to stop the errant vessel. In other words, as the Basic Rules of 
the Protocol put it, parties do not have unlimited choice of methods or means 
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of warfare; weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare that cause 
rf1 . • ffi . hib· d 275 supe uous mJury or unnecessary su enng are pro Ite. 
Four years after signature of Protocol I, the 1981 Conventional Weapons 
Convention276 was signed, with three protocols elaborating upon prohibited 
weaponry. It too is not in force for the United States. 
Protocol I of the Convention denounces use of weapons whose primary effect 
is bodily injury by fragments undetectable by x_rays.2n Although usually 
applicable to land warfare, the Protocol would deny use of such antipersonnel 
weapons in attacks on enemy merchant ships. 
Protocol III defines incendiary weapons or munitions as devices whose 
primary purpose is to burn persons or objects. Munitions with incidental 
incendiary effects, such as white phosphorus illumination shells, or munitions 
combined with penetration, blast or fragmentation effects, such as armor-pierc-
ing shells, where the incendiary effect is not specifically designed to cause bum 
injuries, are excluded from the prohibition. Protocol III forbids incendiary 
attacks on the civilian population, civilians or civilian objects; or on a military 
objective within a concentration of civilians, if airborne weapon delivery is 
contemplated. If other than airborne delivery is contemplated, incendiary attacks 
may be used if there is clear separation between the military objective and civilian 
. d . talc . .. 11 ral dam 278 concentrations an precautions are en to mImmIze co ate age. 
Protocol III should have little impact on war at sea, because incendiary weapons 
as defined in Protocol III are seldom used at sea; a rare example is the napalm 
attack on the U.S.S. Liberty. Protocol III would not have applied to the assault 
on the Liberty, which was a U.S. warship with only service people aboard.279 
However, the Protocol would apply to attacks on merchantmen crewed by 
civilians if they are not part of the war effort. Protocol III is concerned with the 
effect ofincendiary weapons on civilians and civilian objects, and unless enemy 
merchant ships could be classified as civilian objects, Protocol III would not 
apply to the vessel. Unless the prohibitions against incendiary attack when the 
military objective (the ship) is surrounded by civilians could be construed to 
include the military objective surrounding civilians (the usual relationship of 
crew aboard a vessel), Protocol III would not apply to the merchant crew, ifit 
be assumed that they would be classified as civilians, which is unllkely.28o 
Protocol II of the Conventional Weapons Convention covers mine warfare 
and booby-traps but is limited to land warfare.281 Several provisions might be 
cited for analogous treatment for naval warfare, however. The Protocol bans 
indiscriminate use of mines; mines in civilian-concentrated areas unless close to 
a military objective or warnings are given civilians; remotely delivered mines 
unless used in a military objective area or an area with military objectives and 
locations are recorded or a neutralizing device is used, and advance warning 
is given civilians "unless circumstances do not permit" such. Belligerents 
must record minefield locations. If a U.N. peacekeeping force is employed, 
Walker 153 
belligerents must, if requested by the U.N. commander, remove or render 
harmless all mines, protect the force from effects of mines, and supply informa-
tion on minefields. If a U.N. fact-finding mission is involved, belligerents must 
protect the mission from mines or supply minefield information if protection is 
not feasible.282 The same analysis with respect to indiscriminate use and civilian 
concentrations and incendiary weapons applies to Protocol II. The provisions 
governing remotely-delivered mines would have impact on enemy merchant 
ships; they could only be used in a military objective area or an area with military 
objectives, e.g., enemy merchantmen, e.g., a war zone or exclusion zone, and 
then only iflocations are recorded or neutralizing devices are used, and if civilians 
(e.g., neutral merchant ships) are warned. Given the relatively temporary nature 
of zones and the availability of neutralizing devices - as much to protect one's 
own forces from accidents - adaptation of Protocol II's principles to maritime 
warfare would seem to pose few problems. 
F. Falklands/Malvinas: 1982 
The legality of the British attack on the fishing trawler Nanval duJjng this 
conflict has been noted by NWP 9A. Nanval had an Argentine naval officer 
aboard and had been used for intelligence-gathering~ (Nanval, as an oceangoing 
trawler, arguably might also be said to have been outside the exception because 
of her size, 1400 tons).283 
Both belligerents attacked merchant vessels employed in the enemy's war-
fighting or war-sustaining effort; there is no recorded protest. The United 
Kingdom employed over SO STUFT (Ships Taken Up From Trade) vessels, 
privately owned ships, ranging in size from the liner Queen Elizabeth II to the 
cable ship Iris, that were requisitioned from their owners. The containership 
Atlantic Conveyor, lost to Exocet attack, was among the casualties of war. These 
vessels should be distinguished from Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) ships such as 
Sir Galahad, also lost, and RF A tankers similar in function to requisitioned 
tankers. Argentina apparently used both STUFT -type ships and naval 
auxiliaries.284 The United Kingdom published the location of its hospital ships 
as operating in a "Red Cross box," and Argentina respected this neutral zone. 
There is nothing in GWSEA requiring or approving such, and there appears to 
be no custom - apart from the cartel ship analogy - to permit such.285 Such a 
neutral zone may be established for land warfare,286 and demonstrates the 
possibility of adaptation ofland war norms for conflict at sea. 
On April 7, 1982 the United Kingdom declared a 200-mile Maritime 
Exclusion Zone (MEZ), to be effective April 12, for all Argentine shipping 
around the Falklands/Malvinas. On April 23 the United Kingdom established a 
Defensive Sea Area (DSA) or "defensive bubble" around its task force, warning 
that approach by Argentine civil or military aircraft, warships or naval auxiliaries 
would be dealt with "appropriately." On May 1, when fighting started in the 
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Falklands/Malvinas, the MEZ was changed to a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) 
for all ships supplying the Argentine war effort; MEZ coverage was extended 
on May 7 to all sea areas more than 12 miles off the Argentine coast. Argentina 
had declared a 200-mile defense zone (DZ) off its coast and around the 
Falklands/Malvinas on April 13, after having protested the British action. MEZ 
enforcement capability came on the day of its enforcement.287 Presumably 
Argentina could have enforced the DZ ifit had chosen to do so, although after 
the cruiser General Belgrano's sinking, Argentine naval forces, except for naval 
aviation and possibly submarines, did not figure in the war. On May 11 Argentina 
declared all waters of the South Atlantic Ocean a war zone, threatening to attack 
any British vessel therein. Apparently the only neutral ship attacked by the 
Argentines in the war zone was the Hercules, a Liberian-flag tanker in ballast that 
was owned by United States interests. Although the Soviet Union belatedly 
protested the lawfulness of the British TEZ, it apparently did not object to the 
Argentine DZ, and did observe the U.K. TEZ.288 The United States had 
published warnings to U.S. vessels and vessels beneficially owned by u.S. 
interests like Hercules two days before she was hit.289 OnJuly 12, active hostilities 
in the Falklands/Malvinas ended, but the United Kingdom continued the TEZ 
and economic sanctions. Ten days later, the TEZ was lifted, but the United 
Kingdom warned Argentina to keep military ships and aircraft away from the 
islands, declaring a 150-mile Protection Zone.290 The TEZ had been relatively 
successful, although Argentina succeeded in airlifting supplies in until the last 
days of the war. Apparently Argentine sealift efforts failed.291 
(1) Appraisal 
Commander Fenrick proposed an analysis in 1986 for legality of the exclusion 
zone in the context of the Falklands/Malvinas War and the then ongoing Tanker 
War in the Persian Gulf: 
If belligerents use exclusion zones, they should publicly declare the existence, 
location, and duration of the zones, what is 'excluded from the zone, and the 
sanctions likely to be imposed on ships or aircraft entering the zone without 
permission, and also provide enough lead time before the zone comes into effect 
to allow ships to clear the area. As with blockades, "paper" zones are insufficient. 
Belligerents declaring zones should deploy sufficient forces to the zone to make 
it "effective," that is, to expose ships or aircraft entering the zone to a significant 
probability of encountering submarines, ships, or aircraft engaged in enforcing the 
zone. All militarily practicable efforts should be made to employ minimum 
sanctions, such as seizure instead of attack on sight. Similarly, all militarily 
practicable measures should be taken to ensure proper target identification and to 
ensure that only legitimate military objectives, such as military aircraft, warships, 
and ships incorporated into the belligerent war effort, are attacked. The emphasis 
on what is militarily practicable is important. Sometimes the minimum practicable 
sanction will be attack on sight; sometimes ships or aircraft that are not legitimate 
military objectives will be attacked because of errors in target identification. There 
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must be a proportional and demonstrable nexus between the zone and the 
self-defence requirements of the state establishing the zone.292 
He asserted, correctly, that Argentina's 200-mile zone around the 
Falklands/Malvinas "was probably adequate and ... its declaration that the entire 
South Atlantic was a war zone was disproportionate to its defense requirements 
and would affect shipping unconnected with the conflict.,,293 Thus the u.S. 
Court of Appeals was correct in assessing liability against Argentina for loss of 
the Hercules, a decision reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States on 
sovereign immunity grounds?94 Commander Fenrick also says that the 200-mile 
British TEZ, although seemingly "an arbitrary interference with the freedom of 
navigation of ... ships of non-parties to the conflict," was a reasonable temporary 
appropriation of a limited area of the high seas away from major shipping routes 
for self-defense purposes to prevent non-party clandestine participation in the 
conflict. The appropriation was accompanied by adequate notice, did not result 
in any casualties to the ships or aircraft of non-parties, and was terminated after 
a brief period on July 22, once the British consolidated their position in the 
Falklands. The British TEZ was, in the circumstances, compatible with the law 
of naval warfare for general wars and with limited warfare trends.295 Professor 
Goldie concurs with the Court of Appeals' and Commander Fenrick's views.296 
War zones as to enemy merchantmen are clearly legitimate so long as they 
are proportional to the military effort.297 Professor Goldie and Admiral Miller 
have made the important point that such zones may be justified, even if illegal 
in terms of size, duration, etc., if such zones are legitimate reprisals to illegal 
acts of adversaries, e.g., the U.S. Pacific Ocean war zone during World War II 
and the allied Atlantic war zones during both W orId Wars. Even if a zone 
is legal in terms of proportionality, etc., such a lawful zone does not justify 
violation of principles of humanitarian law, e.g., shooting survivors in the 
water?98 The conflict also saw development of the U.K. view of self-defense in 
the Charter era.299 
Besides the development of the law of exclusion zones, the war saw applica-
tion of traditional principles applicable to capture or attacks on merchant 
shipping. The exception to the rule against capture or destruction of coastal 
fishing vessel was illustrated in the Nanval capture. The trawler had been used 
for intelligence-gathering and was probably too large to be considered a coaster. 
The U.K. action was similar to trends during the Korean War, the Chinese civil 
war, Vietnam, and the Paracel Islands campaign.300 Use of merchantmen to carry 
warfighting/war-sustaining cargoes made such ships liable to attack, and these 
vessels became targets as legitimate as the RFA ships. This repeated a trend from 
previous conflicts.301 On the other hand, exempted vessels, e.g., hospital ships, 
continued to carry the protections they have always enjoyed.302 And the attack 
on Hercules, a neutral-flag merchantmen, was illegal under prior practice.303 
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(2) Other Trends 
On December 10, 1982, the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) was signed. Repeating the U.N. Charter Article 2(4) pledges of 
refraining from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, "or in any manner inconsistent with the 
principles ofintemationallaw embodied in the Charter of the United Nations," 
UNCLOS declares that the high seas shall be used only for peaceful purposes.304 
While UNCLOS thus does not apply to armed conflict situations, consideration 
of some of its terms remains important for two reasons: UNCLOS continues to 
apply to some relationships between belligerents and nonbelligerents, and some 
UNCLOS concepts may be urged for law of naval warfare rules. Although 
UNCLOS cannot be analyzed in detail,305 certain provisions may be mentioned 
briefly. Its terms raise a number of potential issues for war at sea. UNCLOS is 
not yet in force and the United States did not sign the treaty, but many of its 
provisions have been accepted by the United States as a restatement of state 
. 306 practIce. 
The high seas are open to all states, as delimited by UNCLOS; freedom of 
. .. d 307 "N alidl b· f naVIgatIon IS guarantee . 0 state may v y purport to su ~ect any part 0 
the high .seas to its sovereignty." The 1958 High Seas Convention has similar 
terms.308 How should these claims be reconciled with a belligerent's proclama-
tion of a MEZ or a TEZ? Every state has the right to sail ships flying its flag on 
the high seas and may set conditions for granting nationality to its ships, for ship 
registration, and for the right to fly its flag. As with the 1958 High Seas 
C . h" . . li k b h S d h h· .. 309 onventIon, t ere must eXIst a genume n etween t e tate an t e SIp. 
The recent draft U.N. Ship Registration Convention would elaborate on the 
UNCLOS genuine link principles.31o Will or should these provisions impact 
the "flag only" rule? Professor Wolfrum has stated that they do not?11 UNCLOS 
also provides for the right of approach and visit, for pirates, slavers and narcotics 
trafficking, except for warships and vessels "used only on government non-com-
mercial service," which have complete immunity.312 These provisions, in terms 
of procedures and immunities, appear congruent with the principles of naval 
warfare except, of course, the right of belligerents to attack and destroy enemy 
warships and naval auxiliaries, and the conditional right to attack enemy 
merchant ships. Other UNCLOS provisions declare the right to fish on the high 
seas subject to other treaty obligations, rights of coastal states, and the obligation 
to conserve high seas resources.313 There are also requirements for preserving 
and protecting the marine environment.314 These parallel principles of the 1977 
Environmental Modification Convention and Protocol 1,315 and these UN-
CLOS principles might be invoked by neutrals.316 
The response to all ~hese questions, which might arise in the context of 
nonbelligerent states' claims, is met by UNCLOS Article 87(1), which subjects 
high seas usage to "conditions laid down by this Convention [UNCLOS] and 
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by other rules of intemationallaw,,,317 i.e., the rules of anned conflict at sea, 
among other norms; there is a parallel provision in the 1958 High Seas 
Convention.318 To the extent that UNCLOS incorporates by reference other 
treaties,319 UNCLOS is subject to the treaty law of naval warfare, e.g., the 1907 
Hague Convention IX regarding capture during naval war.320 Thus, UNCLOS 
stands on the same footing as the 1958 High Seas Convention; it is a treaty for 
those party to it - and important naval powers like the United States are not -
with important exceptions to it.321 To the extent that UNCLOS Article 87(1) 
represents a customary nonn - and about 30 years of practice under the analogous 
provision of the High Seas Convention would seem to have ripened the treaty 
rule into a customary nonn - the result is the same for nations not party to 
UNCLOS, such as the United States. The provision, in Article 88 ofUNCLOS, 
that the high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes,322 must be read as 
subject to the Article 87(1) limitation. This is congruent with UNCLOS Article 
301, "Peaceful uses of the seas," which provides: 
In exercising their rights and perfonning their duties under this Convention, States 
Parties shall refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the princll'les of international law embodied in the Charter of the United 
Nations.3 
Thus the law of the sea and naval warfare stands on the same footing as the law 
ofland warfare and the U.N. Charter. States are subject to the Charter, including 
rights of self-defense under Article 51 and perhaps under customary law. 
UNCLOS governs uses of the sea, subject to other rules of international law, 
i.e., the law of naval warfare.324 
Appearing in 1982, Professor O'Connell's IntemationalLAw of the Sea traced 
the evolution of the rules evolving from World War II, and the traditional list 
of exceptions from attack, e.g., fishing boats, hospital ships, etc.325 O'Connell 
notes the military necessity principle, distinguishing between situations where 
overt activity (e.g., killing survivors of a sinking) would be illegal, and passive 
action (e.g., failure to pick up survivors of a sinking because oflegitimate fear of 
being attacked by the enemy), which would be legal. He believes that "like other 
mediating rules, 'military necessity' does not annul the principle [of humanity] , 
and must be stricdy construed and applied ifit is not to do so.,,326 He seems to 
take no clear position beyond World War II practice on the issue of sinking 
anned enemy merchant vessels, that submarines were exempted from the duties 
imposed on surface raiders.327 While restating the traditional rule that a ship's 
"enemy character is indicated by the flag ... it is entided to fly [, t]hat is now 
to be read with the modem rules for attributing nationality to ships[,]" i.e., 
apparendy with the genuine link theory,328 discussed and criticized earlier in the 
peacetime law of the sea context.329 As long as an exclusion zone has been 
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publicized and neutral shipping is not put unduly at risk, O'Connell would justify 
an exclusion zone as a reasonable means of self_defense.33o 
G. The Iran-Iraq War, 1980_88331 
When Iraq invaded Iran on September 22, 1980, Iran declared Persian Gulf 
waters up to 40 miles offher coasts a war zone (officially titled an "exclusion 
zone"), announced new shipping lanes through the Strait of Hormuz, 
prohibited all transportation of materials to Iraqi ports, and warned of retaliations 
if Persian Gulf nations gave Iraq facilities.332 Iraq responded in early October, 
declaring that the Persian Gulfnorth of29°30'N was a "prohibited war zone." 
This was the area for the Tanker War until March 1984.333 Iranian bomb attacks 
closed Iraq's oil terminals and blocked all ofIraq's commercial ports at the start 
of the war, thus forcing Iraq to use pipelines to non-Iraqi ports to send out oil 
or accept war-sustaining goods through other means, i.e., nearby neutral 
ports.334 "Whether classified as absolute or conditional contraband, oil and the 
armaments which its sale or barter on international markets [brought], were 
absolutely essential to the war efforts of the Persian Gulfbelligerents." Neither 
side declared contraband lists, nor were high seas blockades instituted, although 
the Iranian exclusion zone, covering the Shatt al-Arab littoral, was in affect a 
blockade ofIraq's small coastline.335 No prize courts were established.336 Iran 
did patrol the Gulf in 1981, interrogating ships thought to be carrying con-
traband. A Kuwaiti survey ship and a Danish freighter were seized on suspicion 
of contraband, but both vessels were let go. Iraq protested seizure of the Danish 
ship as a flagrant violation of international law. Iran was careful, however, to 
avoid provoking its neighbors or major Western powers, being dependent on 
trans-shipments from the United Arab Emirates and food imports through the 
Gu1£337 The Danish vessel, the Elsa Cat, had been taken in the Strait ofHormuz; 
Iran declared that its navy "guarantee[d] the security of all ships in the Strait 
... but will not allow Iraq or anybody else to abuse this wartime situation to 
carry war materials for Iraq. ,,338 
In September 1980, the United States, after pledging "strict neutrality," had 
declared that it intended to do what was necessary, including naval action, to 
keep open the Strait ofHormuz. By October 15, at least 60 Australian, French, 
U.K. and U.S. warships were in the Indian Ocean to protect the Strait oil route; 
there were 29 Soviet vessels in the area.339 The U.N. Security Council passed 
Resolution 479, calling for cessation of hostilities, also in September 1980.340 
In late 1981, President Reagan reaffirmed and expanded the Carter Doctrine 
to include a U.S. interest in dealing with any threat to Saudi Arabia and a 
readiness to keep the Strait ofHormuz open ifIran tried to stop shipping there. 
The international aspect of this U.S. critical defense zone (CDZ) was undoub-
tedly lawful in its premise of defense from external aggression and the open nature 
ofits communication.341 Moreover, the CDZ was definite in its boundaries and 
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proportional to the interest protected, i.e., the flow of Gulf oil to the West and 
to Japan. (Saudi Arabia produces about 20 percent of the Earth's oil consump-
tion.) 
By early 1982, Iraq could only export oil through the trans-Turkey pipeline; 
Syria closed the Iraqi pipeline to the Mediterranean.342 OnJanuary 14, of that 
year, Iraq issued a warning to international shipping "to keep clear of the western 
part of the Gulf as any ships traveling in that area would be treated the same way 
as three vessels which Iraq claimed to have sunk on Jan[uary] 11 as they were 
leaving the Iranian port of Ban dar Khomeni." On March 10, it was reported 
that Iraq had mined the channel linking this port and the port of Ban dar Mashahr 
with the open sea. An Iranian tanker had been lost in February, probably due 
to mines.343 
On August 12, 1982, Iraq announced its Gulf Maritime Exclusion Zone 
(GMEZ) and two days later warned foreign shipping to stay clear of Iranian 
waters in the upper Gulf, including waters around Kharg Island, from which 
Iran was exporting up to 2 million barrels of petroleum a day to finance the war 
effort. On August 29, Iran responded, declaring it would protect foreign shipping, 
begin escorting foreign shipping, and deployed ships with surface-to-air missiles 
at Kharg. Iran began giving naval protection to shuttle convoys of Iranian-flag 
and neutral flag merchantmen that lifted oil from Iran's northern Gulf ports to 
those farther down the shore for world export. Iraq conducted air strikes against 
these convoys throughout 1982, 1983 and 1984.344 When Iraq bombed Iran's 
Nowruz oil offihore installations 40 miles west ofKharg Island in March 1983, 
a large oil slick resulted. Although early reports that the slick had equalled the 
area of Belgium were later discounted, it was big enough to threaten desalination 
plants in Bahrain, Qatar and Saudi Arabia before strong winds blew it offihore 
and partially dispersed it. Fish imports into the UAE were stopped because they 
were oil-contaminated. Iraq rejected Iran's request for a partial truce so that oil 
cappers could try to stop the 2,000 to 5,000 barrels per day flow.345 Because of 
the Iraqi attacks on Gulf oil shipping, the London-based War Risks Rating 
Committee raised the rates for marine cargo insurance in 1982 and 1984.346 
Early in 1982, Iraq bombed the Nowruz offihore oilfield installations, causing 
an oil slick in the Gulf; previously Iraq had bombed Iran's Kharg Island 
installations. An Iranian convoy of neutral flag tankers was hit by Iraqi aircraft. 
Throughout 1983 and early 1984, Iranian Navy-escorted convoys were hit.347 
In September 1982 the Arab Summit urged an end to the war and compliance 
with the Security Council resolutions.348 In 1983 and 1984, the Council again 
called for a ceasefire, condemning the Iranian attacks, and affirming the right to 
free navigation and commerce in the Gul£349 By now the United States had 
established its Central Command;350 France, Great Britain and the USSR were 
also maintaining a presence in the Indian Ocean.351 The USSR and other nations 
proposed a U.N. naval force to patrol the GuI£352 The United States announced 
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new self-defense measures for its warships in Notices to Mariners and Notices 
to Airmen in January 1984; the measures were justified on self-defense grounds 
when Iran protested.353 
In 1984, the GMEZ was extended to 50 miles around Kharg Island; the war 
was moving down the Gul£ Tankers were hit at Kharg. Iraq attacked neutral-flag 
vessels by aircraft and mining outside the GMEZ. Iran attacked neutral flag 
tankers on the high seas and in Saudi territorial waters; some were in ballast, 
some were destined for or headed from Saudi ports, and others were carrying 
Kuwaiti crude. Although there was a U.N.-sponsored ceasefire from June 1984 
to March 1985, the attacks continued episodically. In May 1985 Iran again began 
attacking tankers bound to or from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In June and 
September 1985, the Iranian Navy intercepted and detained two Kuwaiti ships; 
in September Iran's visit and search procedures, looking for Iraq-bound strategic 
materials, were stepped up. Ships stopped included Chinese, Danish, German, 
Kuwaiti, U.K. and U.S.-flag merchantmen. Some vessels bound for the United 
Arab Emirates were diverted by Iran to Bandar Abbas. A French warship began 
the precedent of defense of French-flag merchant ships in October. It positioned 
itself between the French merchantman Ville d'Angers and an Iranian warship, 
warning the latter that it would use force if the Iranian tried to intercept Ville 
d'Angers. (French rules of engagement declared that French warships would fire 
on forces refusing to break off attacks on neutral merchantmen under attack; the 
result had been a drop in attacks near French men-of-war.) Nevertheless, France 
announced that its navy would not convoy French tankers. In Apri11986, aU .S. 
destroyer similarly had warned an Iranian warship off what may have been a 
planned boarding of the S.S. President McKinley, a U.S.-flag merchantman. By 
Apri11987, Iran had searched 1200 ships over the previous 18 months and had 
confiscated 30 cargoes. It was becoming clear that although Iran could not close 
the Strait by military action, it might succeed in scaring off enough shipping to 
make a difference. Iran began to shuttle oil, which it sold to finance the war, 
down the coast from Kharg Island to the Sirri oil terminal.354 Despite the action 
of the U.S. destroyer, the United States had recognized that "there is a basis in 
international law for ship searches by belligerents" in March 1986.355 The United 
Kingdom had stated inJanuary 1986 that a right of visit and search was an aspect 
of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.356 The Netherlands 
similarly recognized a right of visit and search, but only as to ships proceeding 
to and from belligerents' ports.357 Only in 1987 did Iran enact legislation 
concerning prize law. By that time the GCC states - e.g., Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia - had been regarded as having "unbelligerent" status.358 
In 1982, U.N. Secl!-rity Council Resolutions 514 and 522 called for an end 
to the war. Resolution 540 (1983) approved "the right of free navigation and 
commerce in international waters, call[ed] upon all States to respect this right 
and also call[ed] upon the belligerents to cease ... hostilities in •.. the Gulf, 
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including all sea-lanes, navigable waterways ... and to respect the integrity of 
the other littoral States .... " Resolution 552 of June 1, 1984 repeated the call 
for "the right offree navigation," specifically condemning recent (i.e., Iranian) 
attacks on commercial ships en route to and from states not party to the 
conflict.359 
In the summer of 1984, mines detonated in the Gulf of Suez and the Strait 
ofBab el Mandeb, damaging several ships. Although Iran along with Libya was 
accused oflaying the mines, Iran denied the charges, and it is thought that the 
Libyan cargo ship Ghat laid them. Egypt exercised its rights under the Constan-
tinople Convention360 to inspect all shipping, and a half dozen nations' navies 
cooperated in locating and destroying the mines, clearly illegally laid under 
internationallaw?61 
One more Security Council resolution called for a ceasefire in late 1986?62 
In August Iraq bombed Iran's Sirri terminal for the first time; the war was moving 
further down the Gulf toward the Strait ofHonnuz. A British-registered, Hong 
Kong-owned tanker was badly damaged at Sirri. Iran's Lavan and Larak terminals 
were then hit. In November Iran hit the United Arab Emirates' Abu al-Bakoush 
oil installations.363 In September 1986, Iran had fired on, stopped and searched 
the Soviet merchant ship Pyotr Emtsov, bound for Kuwait with arms ultimately 
destined for Iraq. The USSR protested the incident. Both belligerents continued 
to attack merchantmen in the Gulf, regardless of cargo or destination. The USSR 
sent a Krivak-class frigate to escort four Soviet vessels carrying arms to Iraq from 
the Straits of Honnuz to Kuwait, signalling to the belligerents that the USSR 
would protect Soviet-flag ships. The Kitty Hawk carrier battle group deployed off 
Oman in the Indian Ocean, the United Kingdom and France increased their 
ship activity, and the U.K. Indian Ocean (i.e., Annilla) squadron began to spend 
half its time in the Gu1£364 The U.K. position on the Gulf shifted in 1986, 
however, from statements of British "neutrality" in the "war" to U.K. "impar-
tiality" in "armed conflict," partly to attempt to ensure that the law of blockade 
would not be applied to the detriment of British shipping.365 
Besides traditional seaborne boardings, Iran began using helicopters for visit 
and search.366 Some merchantmen began to carry chaff canisters to confuse 
incoming missiles, while others were being repainted dull, non-reflective gray 
for the same reason. Although most merchant ships remained unanned, a U.S. 
helicopter reported coming under missile fire from a Greek ship. Iran reportedly 
completed testing Chinese antiship Silkwonn missiles, and the United States 
again expressed concern over keeping the Strait ofHonnuz open. Press reports 
said that the Iranian Air Force had established a suicide plane squadron to attack 
merchant shipping like the Japanese kamikazi flights of World War 11.367 Clearly 
the Gulf was becoming a more dangerous place as all actors prepared new tactics 
and new technologies. In May 1987, Kuwait and the United States began 
negotiations leading to transfer of 11 tankers from the Kuwaiti to the U.S. flag. 
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An Iranian patrol boat fired on and damaged another Soviet merchantman, the 
Ivan Koroteav. The United States and Kuwait completed reflagging arrangements, 
having preempted the USSR, which had to settle for chartering three of its 
tankers to Kuwait; the charters were renewed into 1988.368 Although assailed 
in some quarters, the U.S. re-flagging comported with internationallaw.369 In 
mid-May, one of the USSR tankers hit a mine, said by the Soviets to have been 
placed by Iran. A day later, on May 17, U.S.S. Stark was hit by Iraqi fighter-
launched Exocet missiles.370 The United States began revising its Rules of 
Engagement for possible interactions between U.S. and Iraq's forces and, 
incidentally, anyone else displaying hostile intent or committing hostile acts. 
U.S. forces in the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulfwere augmented. 
The President ordered a higher state of alert for u.s. naval forces in the area and 
warned the belligerents that u.s. warships would fire if their aircraft approached 
u.s. vessels in a manner indicating hostile intent, unless they provided adequate 
notification of their intentions. 
The warning was published to the international community through the issuance 
of a Notice to Mariners and a similar Notice to Airmen, warning ships and aircraft 
that u.s. Navy vessels in the Persian Gulf, Strait ofHormuz, Gulf of Oman, and 
North Arabian Sea were taking additional defensive precautions in response to 
the Stark attack and the continuing terrorist threat in the region. The Notice to 
Mariners requested ships and other vessels to establish radio contact with u.s. 
forces on prescribed international radio frequencies and to identify themselves and 
state their intentions as soon as they were detected. It advised that, in order to 
avoid inadvertent confrontation, ships and craft, including military vessels, might 
be requested to change course to remain well clear of u.s. naval vessels. The 
notice warned that failing to respond to requests for identification and intentions, 
or to warnings or a request to remain clear, and operating in a threatening manner 
could place the ship or craft at risk by u.s. defensive measures. It also advised that 
illumination of u.s. naval vessels with weapons fire control radar would be 
viewed with "suspicion" and could result in immediate defensive reaction. Finally, 
it stressed the u.s. forces would remain mindful of navigational considerations of 
ships and craft in their immediate vicinity, especially when operating in confined 
waters. 
With a few exceptions, the Notice to Mariners and the Notice to Airmen [were] 
successful in reducing the risk of an inadvertent confrontation with other ships 
and aircraft. The notices [struck] a reasonable balance between high seas freedom 
of navigation and overflight and the inherent right of self-defense in protecting 
U.S. naval vessels from a belligerent or terrorist attack.371 
InJuly, the United States began convoying re-flagged tankers. The United States 
announced that its actions were consistent with international law, which 
recognized the right of a neutral to escort and protect ships flying its flag which 
did not carry contraband. The United States added that its ships would not be 
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carrying oil from Iraq and that neither Iran nor Iraq would thus have any basis 
for taking hostile actions against u.s. warships or the vessels they protected. If 
a Gulfbelligerent attempted to conduct visit and search of a U.S.-flag vessel 
under protection of a u.s. man-of-war, the u.s. would examine the ship's cargo 
and would certify absence of contraband, thereby paralleling the rules of the 
unratified 1909 London Declaration. In August the re-flagged S. S. Bridgeton hit 
a mine; the u.s. Navy began providing mine protection.372 On September 21, 
1987, the u.s. Navy caught the Iran Ajr laying mines in the shipping lanes and 
sank it, arguing that this was done in self-defense.373 
The U.K. position on the war was different from that of France or the United 
States: 
Britain [did] not, on the whole, [refer] to the traditional law of war and neutrality 
at sea. Instead, it [had] couched its pronouncements in terms of freedom of 
navigation and the law of self-defense, based on Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 
So enthusiastic [was] the British Government about basing its statements on this 
provision that the General Council of British Shipping (GCBS), which distributes 
guidance notes to its members, actually [reproduced] the text of Article 51 to be 
passed on to masters of British merchant ships entering the Gul£ Emphasis on 
Article 51 rather than the traditional law [was] particularly apparent in certain 
statements concerning visit and search. When the British merchant ship Barber 
Persells was stopped by Iranians in January 1986 and forced into an Iranian port, 
the British Government explained its position in this way. 
The United Kingdom upholds the general principle of freedom ofnaviga-
tion on the high seas. However, under Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter, a State, such as Iran, actively engaged in an armed conflict, is 
entitled in exercise of its inherent right of self defense to stop and search a 
foreign merchant ship on the high seas, if there is reasonable ground for 
suspecting that the ship is taking arms to the other side for use in the conflict. 
This is an exceptional right: if the suspicions prove to be unfounded and if 
the ship has not committed acts calculated to give rise to suspicion, then the 
ship's owners have a good claim for compensation for loss caused by the 
delay. 
The general advice given by the Foreign Office and reproduced in the GCBS 
guidance notes of advice [was] that even if a ship [was] not carrying any 
contraband, it [was] usually better to submit to visit and search by the Iranian Navy 
and to point out to the Iranian officer conducting the search that ifhis suspicions 
[proved] to be unfounded and unreasonable, then the ship's owners [would] have 
a right to compensation. ' 
The United Kingdom [had] protested against Iran's detention of ships on several 
occasions, not so much for exercising the right to visit and search per se, but for 
the delays that have occurred and, in some cases, on occasions where the Foreign 
Office believed an exercise of visit and search could not have been occasioned 
reasonably by suspicions of a ship carrying prohibited goods. Nevertheless, unlike 
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the French and U.S. Governments, the British Government [had] made no 
attempt to say that its warships would certify whether ships were carrying 
prohibited goods, and British warships [had] not intervened to prevent the exercise 
of visit and search. Nor [had] British pronouncements referred to the exercise of 
belligerent ri~ts by Iran. They [had] been couched instead in terms of reference 
to Article 51. 74 
The Annilla Patrol began "accompanying" U.K. shipping - i.e., those vessels of 
U.K. registry or registered in a U.K. colony or dependent territory (e.g., Hong 
Kong), but not Commonwealth-registered ships - (e.g., Singapore) - and flag of 
convenience vessels whose majority ownership is British or in a British colony 
or dependence-as far north as Bahrain. U.K. protection did not extend to ships 
crewed by British mariners or to ships with no connection to the United 
Kingdom, as France and the United States were later prepared to do. The U.K. 
rules of engagement adhered to Britain's view that U.N. Charter, Article 51, 
governed any U.K. response: "The rules of engagement [were] intended to avoid 
escalation, although the varied nature of potential threat and the possibility of 
surprise attack are recognized and the inherent right of self-defence of Royal 
Navy ships or British merchant vessels under their protection, is not cir-
cumscribed or prejudiced." The result would have posed "interesting questions" 
as to whether a U.K. warship could have defended U.K. merchantmen, as 
defined above, or British-crewed ships. One "practical solution" might be that 
an atta~ on the merchant vessel "might reasonably be perceived as an attack on 
the warship as well. In that situation, the warship [would] be able to defend itself 
and in doing so defend the merchant vessel accompanying it. ,,375 
All commentators seem to have agreed on the illegality of Iran's use of 
unanchored mines, particularly in shipping lanes. The same is true for mines laid 
in the Red Sea in 1984. While a state may mine a defense area along its coast 
with due notice of the minefield, employment of drifting mines is not lawfu1.376 
By mid-1987, Iran had attacked nearly 100 ships of 30 nationalities, using 
aircraft, helicopters, small boats and warships as platforms. Iraq had attacked over 
200 vessels, mostly those owned or chartered by Iran.377 In late May 1987, the 
USSR had sent three minesweepers to join its two frigates that had been on 
patrol in the Gulf since 1986.378 The June Venice Economic Summit of major 
Western powers and Japan "agree[ d] that new and concerted international efforts 
[were] urgently required to bring the Iran-Iraq war to an end." Besides calling 
upon the belligerents to end the war and supporting the U.N., the Summit 
"reaffirmed that the principle of freedom of navigation in the Gulf is of 
paramount importance for us and for others and must be upheld. The free flow 
of oil and other traffic through the Strait ... must continue unimpeded." The 
Summit pledged to consult on ways to pursue these important goals effective-
ly.379 On July 20, the Security Council, calling for a cease-fire, "deplor[ed] ... 
the . . . attacks on neutral shipping . . . , the violation of international 
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humanitarian law and other laws of armed conflict," demanded that Iran and 
Iraq "discontinue all military actions on land, at sea and in air." The Council 
called on other nations "to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any 
act which [might] lead to further escalation and widening of the conflict[.],,38o 
In August Great Britain and France agreed to send minesweepers to the Gulf, 
and by September Italian, Belgian and Netherlands ships were on the way.381 
In October 1987, the United States responded to an Iranian Silkworm missile 
attack on a U.S. re-flagged tanker, S.S. Sea Isle City, in Kuwaiti waters by 
destroying offihore oil rigs used as an Iranian gunboat base. The United States 
justified its attack on self-defense grounds, while others argued it was a "carefully 
calculated reprisal," bringing the United States in on Iraq's side.382 The U.S. 
strike was stated to be in specific response to the Iranian attack on Sea Isle City; 
any connection with the Iranian attack on the S.S. Sungari, which had occurred 
the day before Sea Isle City was hit, was avoided. Although Sungari was 
beneficially U.S.-owned, it flew the Liberian flag.383 This established some 
precedent, at least for that stage of the war, that the United States did not consider 
open registry ships, even if owned by U.S. interests, to have enough U.S. 
connection to merit protection. That view changed as the war deepened.J84 In 
any event, in the destruction of the rigs, the U.S. response followed Charter era 
criteria for self-defense: it was proportional, in that only the source of the attacks 
- the host platforms - was destroyed and it was necessary, to remove a continued 
h tral h· . I . al· . 385 Ad· ·d treat to neu s Ippmg. t was not a repns SItuatIOn. secon mCI ent 
came the next month. 
In November 1987, a U.S. Navy frigate fired on a small boat that approached an 
American tanker. The boat did not fire at the tanker but ignored warning shots 
and closed to within 500 yards. The boat turned out to be an unarmed Arab fishing 
boat, not an Iranian patrol boat. The boat was hit and one person on board was 
killed. The incident occurred between the coast of the United Arab Emirates and 
Abu Musa Island, a small island from which Iranian speedboats had carried out 
raids on Gulf shipping. The United States again relied on the inherent right of 
self-defense under international law as the basis for its actions.386 
Fishing boats, if employed as such, are exempt from capture and destruction.387 
This was not the issue here; it was a case of mistaken identity under suspicious 
circumstances. The U.S. plea of self-defense was justified, particularly in view 
of the warning shots that no one could ignore.388 
In November, the Arab League Extraordinary Summit Conference "expressed 
anxiety at the continuation of the war and voiced ... indignation at [Iran's] 
intransigence, provocations and threats to the Arab Gulf States." The Summit 
"condemned Iran's ... procrastination in accepting ... Resolution 598 ... 
[and] called on Iran to accept the Resolution and implement it in toto . ... " The 
international community was asked to "shoulder its responsibilities, exert 
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effective international efforts and adopt measures adequate to make [Iran] 
respond to the calls for peace." Iraq's acceptance of Resolution 598 and its 
positive response to peace initiatives were appreciated. The Summit confirmed 
support for Iran's defense of its territory and "legitimate rights" and declared 
solidarity with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.389 That same month Iran adopted, 
apparently for the first time, what amounted to a declaration of contraband: 
On November 17, 1987, Iran adopted a law according to which all goods 
belonging to states at war with Iran were liable to capture and condemnation. 
Goods belonging to neutral states or to neutral or enemy nationals were liable to 
capture if they fell into certain categories. The first of these categories concerned 
goods the transport of which to enemy territory was prohibited altogether. The 
second concerned goods destined, direcdy or indirecdy, for enemy territory, if 
they effectively contributed to sustain the enemy's war effort.390 
This did not of course cover the circumstances of destruction, without warning, 
of neutral merchantmen, or indeed of destruction of enemy merchant ships. 
In December 1987, a U.S. warship helped rescue a Cypriot crew after an 
Iranian gunboat attack set their tanker ablaze, one of many such attacks in the 
renewed war in the Gul£ Tanker captains began tailing convoys or simulating 
them during night steaming?91 On April 14, 1988, U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts hit 
a mine in a field laid in international waters. In response the United States 
attacked Iranian oil platforms that had been supporting attacks on neutral 
shipping on April 18. Four days later Iranian naval units attacked U.S. naval 
vessels, which destroyed or damaged most of the attackers?92 By this time five 
European NATO allies - Belgium, Britain, France, Italy and the Netherlands-
had sent more than 40 warships to the Gulf for escort and mine suppression 
duty?93 The United States began extending protection to neutral ships in 
distress, if those vessels were outside war/exclusion zones, were not carrying 
contraband, and were not resisting legitimate visit and search by a Persian Gulf 
belligerent, on April 29.394 This action also comported with internationallaw.395 
In May, Iraqi aircraft hit Iran's Larak oil terminal in the Strait ofHormuz; Sea wise 
Giant, Liberian-registered and the world's largest supertanker, was among five 
ships hit.396 In July 1988, a week after the Airbus incident of July 3, U.S. 
ship-based helicopters attacked Iranian gunboats that had set afire a Panamanian-
registered tanker owned by Japanese interests.397 
On the diplomatic front, Saudi Arabia had broken diplomatic relations with 
Iran in April 1988. In June the second Arab League Extraordinary Summit 
reaffirmed its 1987 communique on the war.398 By mid-June, however, Great 
Britain and France had restored diplomatic relations with Iran. Saudi Arabia 
announced a $12-$30 billion arms deal with Great Britain, which included 6 to 8 
minesweepers. Iran announced acceptance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 
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598 on July 18, and the U.N. Secretary-General announced a ceasefire effective 
August 20, 1988.399 
The United States announced the end of escorted convoy operations in the 
Gulfin October 1988.400 In January 1989, "de-flagging" procedures for revert-
ing the tankers to the Kuwaiti ensign began.401 By that time, the Western naval 
presence in the Gulf had been reduced sharply.402 
(1) Appraisal 
Commander Fenrick has summarized the Tanker War: 
The Iran-Iraq conflict was a major war, not a small war. For the only time since 
World War II, deliberate and sustained operations were carried out against 
merchant ships. As a general statement, prior to March 1984, Iraq attacked all 
vessels in a proclaimed exclusion zone at the northern end of the Gul£ From 
March 1984 until the end of the conflict, Iraq switched the focus ofits anti-ship-
ping campaign in an effort to attack the weak link in Iran's war economy and to 
arouse world interest in the conflict. Iraq directed most ofits attacks against tankers, 
most of them neutral and unconvoyed, sailing to or from Kharg Island, the very 
heavily defended main Iranian oil terminal, located towards the northern end of 
the Persian Gul£ All the Iraqi attacks were delivered by shore-based aircraft and 
almost all involved the use of air launched missiles. Iraq appears to have devoted 
minimal effort to obtaining visual identification of the target before missile launch, 
with the result that accidents, such as the Iraqi attack on the USS Stark, did occur. 
Iran does not appear to have begun attacking commercial shipping until Iraq 
commenced its anti-tanker campaign in 1984. Since there was no sea traffic with 
Iraq, Iran attacked neutral merchant shipping destined to and from neutral ports 
in the Gulf, presumably in an effort to persuade Iraq's financial backers, the other 
Gulf states, to dissuade Iraq from its campaign against the Kharg Island tankers. 
Iran's attacks on merchant shipping were less numerous than those ofIraq and, in 
general, less costly in lives and property damage because they were conducted 
with rockets instead of missiles. In addition, it is understood that Iran devoted 
more effort to target identification than did Iraq. On the other hand, Iran did not 
conduct its attacks in declared exclusion zones and some ofits attacks were carried 
out in neutral territorial waters.403 
The result was the largest loss of merchant ships and merchant seamen's lives 
since W orId War II: 
Throughout the eight year course of the Gulf War, Iran and Iraq [had] attacked 
more than 400 commercial vessels, almost all of which were neutral State flagships. 
Over 200 merchant seamen [had] lost their lives because of these attacks. In 
material terms, the attacks [had] resulted in excess of 40 million dead weight tons 
of damaged shipping. Thirty-one of the attacked merchants were sunk, and 
another 50 declared total losses. For 1987 alone, the strikes against commercial 
shipping numbered 178, with a resulting death toll of 108. In relative terms, by 
the end of1987, write-offlosses in the Gulf War stood at nearly half the tonnage 
of merchant shipping sent to the bottom in World War II. In all, ships flying the 
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flags of more than 30 different countries, including each of the pennanent 
members of the United Nations Security Council, [had] been subjected to attacks. 
Only about one or two percent of the ship voyages in the Gulfinvolved attacks, 
however.404 Nevertheless, in terms of percentage of losses due to maritime 
casualties worldwide, the statistics were "staggering." During 1982, the first year 
of the Tanker War, 47 percent of all Liberian-flag tonnage losses due to maritime 
casualty occurred in the Gul£ In 1986, the figure was 99 percent; in 1987, more 
than 90 percent, and the final percentages may have gone higher due to late 
declaration of constructive total losses. (Most of the Gulf tanker traffic flew flags 
of convenience, and a third were owned by u.s. nationals, with another 
substantial portion under charter to u.s. nationals.) Insured losses by marine 
underwriters were heavy, reaching $30 million in one month, with resulting 
tremendous increases in war risk premiums. If there were 
any good things [that could] be said of this conflict, they [were] that the Gulf War 
[became] the principal factor in reducing the overtonnaging of the world oil tanker 
fleet and in aiding a recovery of the tanker market, and second, that tremendous 
advances in marine firefighting equipment and techniques [were] directly at-
tributable to recent experience in the GuI£ 
To a government expert, "this [was] too thin a silver lining to justify the 
cloud. ,,405 Iran attacked ships of more 32 national flags, while Iraqi attacks mostly 
concentrated on vessels flagged or chartered by Iran. Iraq concentrated on 
attacking ships within the Iranian war zone, while Iran attacked vessels mostly 
in the lower Gulf, outside its or Iraq's zones. Iraq tended to shoot first and identify 
later, while Iran conducted careful vessel reconnaissance and specific vessel 
identification. Iraq used aircraft for all its attacks, while Iran employed conven-
tional aircraft, helicopters and surface warships or small boats, the latter manned 
by Revolutionary Glfard forces.406 Iraq was never able to produce a major 
interruption in Iran's oil exports to finance the war. The Tanker War was the 
most important part of the fighting at sea.407 
Writing in 1986, before the war had ended, Commander Fenrick noted that 
"It [was] futile to discuss exclusion zones used in this conflict utilizing presumed 
limited war standards, as both belligerents probably [had] gone beyond the 
standards hitherto considered permissible in general war." Because it was 
debatable that unconvoyed neutral tankers could have been considered as part 
of Iran's war effort, Commander Fenrick asserted that "Iraqi practice in using 
exclusion zones touche[d] the outer limits oflega! acceptability and may well 
[have] overstep[ped] the boundary." Iran's conduct in attacking neutral ships 
outside the declared war zones and occasionally in neutral waters "was so 
flagrantly contrary to the laws of maritime warfare that nothing can be said in 
defence ofit." 
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Even if one concedes that the other Gulf states [were] providing financial support 
to Iraq, it does not appear possible to consider the neutral ships engaged in traffic 
with these states to be incorporated into the Iraqi war effort. Iran's desire to take 
action to force Iraq to refrain from attacking the Kharg Island tanker traffic [did] 
not legitimize its actions. It is somewhat surprising that the actions of Iran and 
Iraq in the Persian Gulf[did] not generate a stronger, or at least more vociferous, 
response on the part of other states. It is presumed the relative lack of response is 
owing to the desire of the superpowers to avoid conflict with each other in a 
sensitive area, and to the facts that there is a tanker surplus and an oil glut, that 
the tankers attacked usually belong[ ed] to flag of convenience states, and that the 
loss of life [had] been relatively limited.408 
Another author believes that the Iranian war zone, being more "defensive" in 
nature, was valid under international law . 409 Professor Goldie's excellent analysis 
would say, however, that both sides' zones were disproportionate and therefore 
illegal.410 Professor Dinstein, while granting that war zones have been grafted 
onto the law of maritime warfare, would say that "the so-called exclusion zones 
[were] not proper war zones," because they were not mined or regularly 
patrolled, and there were no safe sea lanes for regulated neutral shipping.411 
While it is true that neither belligerent had traditional naval forces sufficient to 
conduct routine patrols, he does not account for the air surveillance. 
Neither Iran nor Iraq published contraband lists. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
both nations considered petroleum exports critical to financing the war.412 The 
war was also a "total war" insofar as the adversaries were concerned,413 and a 
major conflict insofar as global standards can measure it.414 The result is that Iraq 
was justified in attacking enemy (i.e., Iranian) merchant ships, if loaded with 
war-fighting/war-sustaining cargoes (e.g., oil) outbound from Iranian ports.415 
Iraq was also justified in attacking neutral merchantmen convoyed by Iranian 
warships,416 particularly if those ships carried war-fighting/war-sustaining car-
goes. Neutral vessels carrying such cargo for the Iranian war effort and steaming 
alone were likewise subject to attack by Iraq.417 It has been argued that Iraqi 
attacks on merchantmen within the Iranian exclusion zone were not indis-
criminate: 
Can the Iraqi air attacks on merchant shipping be labeled as indiscriminate because 
they do not identify the targets visually before launching missiles? I believe not. 
First, the Iranian exclusion zone ... made the Iraqi Air Force's target identification 
easier. Iraqi Air Force pilots apparently assume[d] that any large radar return from 
a ship located within the Iranian exclusion zone must be a tanker carrying, or 
destined to carry, Iranian oil. And second, there ... [was] no evidence that any 
protected vessels •.. [were] found within the Iranian exclusion zone.41S 
Fortuitously, Iraq pumped most of its oil to sell and sustain its war effort through 
pipelines to Syria, Saudi Arabia and Turkey and thence to the outside world, or 
financed its war effort through Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. (Whether Kuwait and 
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Saudi Arabia had anus-length bargains with Iraq, or acted out of fear of their 
powerful neighbor, or otherwise, is less than clear.) The result was that Kuwait, 
and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia, were selling oil and turning over some of 
the proceeds to Iraq as loans.419 Clearly the cash or its equivalent to Iraq could 
have been seized as part of its war effort, but equally clearly the oil, sold to 
neutrals and carried in neutral tankers, could not be attacked. Thus, the Iranian 
attacks on neutral merchantmen were illegal; "[a]n attack upon a neutral 
merchant ship known to be engaged in inter-neutral trade [in this war, e.g., 
between Kuwait and an oil-consumer nation] [was,] therefore, a violation of 
la ,,420 M h· f ~ 1 • h . ~_1 w. oreover, wars IpS 0 neUU"'dl natlons may convoy suc neUU:"'dl 
merchantmen.421 Thus the United States was legally justified in convoying the 
re-flagged tankers, and indeed other neutral nations' merchantmen. U.S. con-
voying carried with it the right ofself-defense,422 and thus the U.S. responses 
(e.g., shooting back) were legally justified if they satisfied the criteria of propor-
tionality, which was clearly the case. This was a continuation of trends in other 
conflicts of the era.423 The conflict included interactions with merchant ships in 
coastal states' EEZs; since the EEZ is part of the high seas, such interactions (e.g., 
visit and search, etc.) were as legitimate as if the situation occurred on the high 
424 seas. 
The result may seem anomalous, in that Iraq received a net benefit from the 
operation of the law of neutrality. Its war effort could be financed, albeit 
indirecdy, by neutral tanker traffic carrying Kuwaiti and Saudi oil for sale on 
world markets, while Iran could be condemned for its attacks on such vessels 
while suffering legally-justified attacks on its tankers, and the tankers of other 
neutrals carrying Iranian crude. Nevertheless, this is the result. As Professor 
Tucker put it most apdy, "[t]he fact that the exercise made of these neutral rights 
thereby places one of the belligerent at a disadvantage with respect to its 
opponent does not provide the disadvantaged belligerent with a lawful basis for 
I ·· h' h b d h b· f d· . . ,,425 c aImIng t at It as een ma e teo ~ect 0 Iscnnunatory measures. 
(2) Other Trends 
Several major research efforts appeared as the Tanker War ended: Professor 
Levie's Code ciflntemational Anned C01iflict (1986); the Restatement (Third), Foreign 
Relations LAw cif the United States (1988), NWP 9A (1989), and roundtables under 
the general aegis of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law (IIHL), 1987 
to date.426 Professor Ronzitti edited The LAw cif Naval Warfare (1988), in 
connection with the IIHL meetings; it includes a general introductory analysis, 
commentaries on treaties and other documents (e.g., the 1913 Oxford ManuaQ 
and the texts of treaties and other documents; references to these have been 
made throughout other parts of this article. What follows is an analysis of how 
the Code, the Restatement (Third), NWP 9A, and the ongoing work of the IIHL 
apply to the issue of targeting enemy merchant ships. 
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a. The Levie Code. Professor Levie's Code restates the existing treaty and 
documents-based principles. However, "[t]his Code does not include rules of the 
customary international law of war which have never been formally stated in an 
international document of some nature." He notes that many customary norms 
- e.g., the practice of states - have been "codified" in binding international 
agreements, e.g., the 1907 Hague Conventions; have been codified in interna-
tional agreements that have never been ratified, e.g., the 1909 London Naval 
Treaty; have been restated or expressed in other documents prepared by 
international organizations but not in treaty format; or certain treaties such as 
the 1972 Bacteriological Convention or Protocol I of 1977 that eventually will 
become law.427 
Citing the 1930 London Naval Treaty and the 1936 London Proces-Verbal, 
he states the rule as to attacks on enemy merchant ships: 
1. In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the 
rules ofInternational Law to which surface vessels are subject. 
2. In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop, or of active resistance 
to visit or search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or 
render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed 
passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of safety. For this purpose the ship's 
boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and 
crew is assured, in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of 
land, or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on 
board. 
Professor Levie says that there is some evidence that these are the rules despite 
contrary Allied practice during World War 11.428 
This restrictive view of destruction of enemy merchantmen appears supported 
by his Code provisions on neutrals performing unneutral service. Vessels on 
one-shot service involving transport of enemy armed forces personnel, trans-
mission of intelligence to the enemy, or persons who directly assist enemy 
operations, are subject to condemnation as though carrying contraband.429 On 
the other hand, a neutral vessel will be condemned "and, in a general way, 
receive the same treatment as would be applicable to her if she were an enemy 
merchant vessel" if she 
(a) "takes a direct part in hostilities;" 
(b) "is under the orders or control of an agent placed on board by the enemy 
Government;" 
(c) "is in the exclusive employment of the enemy Government; "[or] 
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(d) "is exclusively engaged at the time either in the transport of enemy troops or 
in the transmission of intelligence in the interest of the enemy." 
Thus a pennanently dedicated vessel may be subject to more severe sanctions -
"the same treatment as ... if she were an enemy merchant vessel" - which may 
mean capture and condemnation. These principles are stated to be customary 
law, based on the 1909 London Declaration.43o Whether action against such 
ships includes destruction, and under what circumstances, is less than clear, such 
being up to "pure" state practice in the absence of treaty or other document.431 
Thus his Code does not necessarily stand for the proposition that enemy merchant 
vessels are not subject to destruction in appropriate circumstances. Whether 
those circumstances would include not placing passengers, crew and papers in 
safety in event of surface or sub-surface attack is debatable, in view of the 1930 
London Treaty and the 1936 Proces-Verbal. 432 
The Code recognizes the traditional exceptions prohibiting attacks on small 
coastal fishing or trading boats engaged as such, hospital ships, etc., and vessels 
carrying cultural property for which due notification has been given.433 Relying 
on Protocol I and the 1977 Environmental Modification Convention, Professor 
Levie states a rule of a general prohibition on methods or means of warfare 
"intended, or [which] may be expected, to cause widespread, long-tenn and 
severe damage to the natural environment. ,,434 
b. The Restatement (Third), Foreign Relations. The Restatement (Third), 
aside from noting the rule that war-coerced treaties are void and suggesting that 
hostilities might be a basis for ending or withdrawing from an agreement under 
fundamental change of circumstances principles,435 does not directly address the 
enemy merchantman attack problem. However, the Restatement does repeat the 
principles of the 1958 High Seas Convention, UNCLOS, the U.N. Ship 
Registration Convention and the Restatement (Second) with respect to the 
"genuine link" concept and duties of flag states to exercise effective authority 
and control over vessels.436 The traditional rules for freedom of the high seas are 
repeated but subject to a "reasonable regard to the interests of other states in 
their exercise of the freedom of the high seas." Conspicuously absent is the 
qualifier, in UNCLOS Article 87(1), that high seas freedoms are subject to "other 
rules ofintemationallaw.',437 The Restatement does acknowledge the right of 
warship high seas transit and asserts that use of warships for aggressive purposes 
would violate U.N. Charter nonns. The right of self-defense is available on the 
high seas, but these principles are tucked away in the Comments and Reporters' 
Notes.438 The departure from UNCLOS Article 87(1) would render the Restate-
ment less helpful in analyzing the relationship of the law of naval warfare to 
UNCLOS, but in a roundabout way, through citation of the Charter principles, 
the Restatement would seem to achieve the same result if it is considered that the 
law of naval warfare, in its treaty aspects, is subject to the Charter,439 and that 
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other principles, e.g., those derived from custom, are viable in the context of 
the Charter.44o The Restatement (Third) cites the 1977 Environmental Modifica-
tion Convention among many other treaties in finding a duty of states, "to the 
extent practicable under the circumstances," to protect the natural environment, 
with state liability for violations.441 The 1949 Geneva Conventions and other 
law of armed conflict principles are not cited in the Restatement's human rights 
provisions, and, although the major treaties are listed and analyzed,442 scant 
attention is paid the public emergency clauses.443 Restatement § 702 says: 
A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, 
encourages, or condones 
(a) genocide, 
(b) slavery or the slave trade 
(c) the murder or causing the disappearance ofindividuals, 
(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, 
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention, 
(f) systematic racial discrimination, or 
(g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human 
rights. 
These are stated to be customary norms in the Commentj444 and (a) through (f) 
have jus cogens quality, such that a treaty - e.g., the public emergency clauses -
cannot override them, according to the Restatement Reporters.445 This differs 
from the express language of the human rights convention, to which many 
nations are parties (but not the United States, except for its relatively recent 
ratification of the Genocide Convention.44~ Since law of armed conflict treaties, 
with one exception, are not cited in the Restatement,447 the usefulness of the 
Restatement, except for its general analytical framework, e.g., on sources oflaw, 
treaties, etc., is less than useful for armed conflict scenarios. 
Given the relative paucity of treatment oflaw of armed conflict issues in the 
Restatement, the impact of the genuine link theory for ships and the claims for 
environmental protection and human rights in the armed conflict scenario 
remains improbable. However, the ready availability of the Restatement with its 
black-letter format, its prestigious authorship, and the similarity of treatment for 
some peace-oriented issues, e.g., the environment, may provoke a spillover effect 
into the law of naval warfare. Professor O'Connell, for example, would seem 
to attempt to read the genuine link theory into prize law or private international 
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law (i.e., conflict of laws) involving capture of belligerent merchantmen.448 
Nevertheless, the rule that nationality of a ship for purposes of visit and search 
or capture, etc. of an enemy merchant vessel depends on its flag, and the flag 
alone, remains well-established. The traditional rule was given additional support 
in the practice of the United States and Kuwait in re-flagging the tankers during 
the 1980-88 war.449 However, the genuine link argument is liable to be raised 
in future merchant ship visit and search, capture, diversion or destruction 
situations. Genuine link may be a useful concept for the calm of a prize or 
criminal case courtroom in the context of conflicts principles, but it is not a 
helpful concept for the naval commander attempting to observe international 
law at sea while defending the ship and protecting national interests. 
c. NWP 9A. In 1989, NWP 9A's annotated supplement appeared. 
Separate provisions state the rules for surface, submarine and air attacks. 
For surface attack, enemy merchant ships may be attacked with or without 
warning if the merchantman: 
(1) actively resists visit and search or capture; 
(2) persistently refuses to stop upon being duly summoned to do so; 
(3) sails under convoy of enemy warships or military aircraft; 
(4) is armed; 
(5) is incorporated into, or assists in any way, the enemy's armed forces intelligence 
system; 
(6) acts in any capacity as a naval or military auxiliary to enemy.armed forces; or 
(7) is integrated into the enemy's war-fighting or war-sustaining effort and 
compliance with the 1936 Proces-Verbal to the 1930 London Protocol would, 
under circumstances of the specific encounter subject the warship to imminent 
danger or would otherwise preclude mission accomplishment. 
Paragraph (4) does not distinguish between defensive and offensive armament, 
a previous distinction, because "[i]n the light of modem weapons, it is impossible 
to determine, if it ever was possible, whether the armament on merchant ships 
is to be used offensively against an enemy or merely defensively." Paragraph (7) 
is new and was: 
added to cope with the circumstance [of a ship] carrying militarily important cargo 
that is not a naval or military auxiliary and to reflect the actual practice of nations, 
at least in general wars. Although the term 'war-sustaining' is not subject to precise 
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definition, "effort" that indirectly but effectively supports and sustains the 
belligerent's war-fighting capability properly falls within the scope of the term. 
The traditional rules applicable to surrenders and post-attack search and rescue 
of the shipwrecked, etc., continue to apply,450 and all of these provisions are 
premised on three fundamental principles of the law of armed conflict: 
1. The right of belligerents to adopt means ofinjuring the enemy is not unlimited. 
2. It is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population as such. 
3. Distinctions must be made between combatants and noncombatants, to the 
effect that noncombatants be spared as much as possible. 
These legal principles governing targeting generally parallel the military principles 
of the objective, mass and economy offorce. The law requires that only objectives 
of military importance be attacked but permits the use of sufficient mass to destroy 
those objectives. At the same time, unnecessary (and wasteful) collateral destruc-
tion must be avoided to the extent possible and, consistent with mission ac-
complishment and the security of the force, unnecessary human suffering must be 
prevented. The law of naval targeting, therefore, requires that all reasonable 
precautions must be taken to ensure that only military objectives are targeted so 
that civilians and civilian objects are spared as much as possible from the ravages 
of war. 
Only combatants and other military objectives may be attacked. Military objec-
tives are those objects which, by their nature, location, purpose, or use, effectively 
contribute to the enemy's war-fighting or war-sustaining capability and whose 
total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization would constitute a definite 
military advantage to the attacker under the circumstances at the time of the attack. 
Military advantage max involve a variety of considerations including the security 
of the attacking force. 51 
NWP 9A adds that neutral vessels acquire enemy character when operating 
direcdy under enemy control, orders, charter, employment, or direction, or 
when such vessels resist an attempt to establish identity, including visit and 
search.452 Thus, as noted earlier, NWP 9A would appear to approve of Iraqi 
attacks on ships carrying oil outbound to sustain the Iranian war eff'ort.453 The 
self-defense aspects of United States responses is less clear.454 The traditional list 
of forbidden targets - hospital ships, coastal fishing and trading boats engaged as 
such, etc. - follows, with the addition of civilian passenger liners at sea, unless they 
are being used for military purposes or refuse to respond to a warship's directions. The 
inevitable civilian deaths in such a sinking "would be clearly disproportionate 
to whatever military advantage that might be gained" from their destruction.455 
Submarines may attack the same categories of enemy merchantmen, although 
the seven-point list has been compressed to four, and military exigencies and 
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the practicalities of submarine configurations are said to excuse more readily 
prior warning or the duty to recover shipwrecked, etc.456 The same rules for 
forbidden targets apply to submarines.457 
Aircraft may attack under the same circumstances as surface warships and 
submarines; the same forbidden target rules apply, and the same humanitarian rules 
for surrender and survivors, etc., apply equally to aircraft, although the prac-
. ali . f· d all h l· b li . d 458 tIc tIes 0 capaclty to accept surren er or re yep sUrvlvors may e mlte • 
Vessels operating under enemy charter possess enemy character, according to 
NWP 9A;459 there is no examination (or refutation) of the "genuine link" 
problems.46o NWP 9A adds that 
There is no settled practice ... regarding the conditions under which the transfer 
of enemy merchant vessels ... to a neutral flag may be made .... However, it is 
generally recognized that, at the very least all such transfers must result in the 
complete divestiture of enemy transfer and control. ... [A naval commander] is 
entitled to seize any vessel transferred from an enemy to a neutral flag when such 
transfer has been made either immediately prior to, or during, hostilities.461 
Thus NWP 9A would approve as legal the Kuwaiti-U.S. re-flagging procedures 
during the Tanker War.462 
NWP 9A approves as legal a temporary exclusion zone, although neutrals 
cannot be denied access.463 Although noting restrictions on chemical, biological 
and nuclear weapons, 464 except as to collateral damage, NWP 9A does not appear 
to include environmental damage in the calculus of attack, and protective 
symbols used in the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention and 1977 
Protocol 1 are supplied for informational purposes only. (As noted earlier, the 
United States is not a party to either treaty.)465 And although protections for the 
civil population are clearly discussed, including situations where the United 
States supports positions in Protocol 1,466 the potential for claims of human rights 
violations is not considered. 
NWP 9A also recites the traditional customary rules for neutral commerce, 
noting the difficulty in distinguishing between absolute and conditional con-
traband, the presumption for enemy destination, exemptions from contraband, 
and aircert/clearcert/navicert procedures.467 Visit and search rules, "similar" to 
those for nonbelligerent visit and search, e.g., for drug interdiction, are set forth 
in full.468 Principles for capture and destruction of neutral vessels and aircraft 
take the traditional U.S. view, which includes forcible measures (i.e., possible 
destruction) of aircraft or ships resisting proper capture and destruction of prizes 
where the ship cannot be taken into port for adjudication or properly released, 
distinguishing between prizes and ships sent to port for visit and search.469 The 
customary blockade rules are recited,470 as are the norms for personnel aboard 
neutral platforms and those interned by neutral govemments.471 
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In summary, then, NWP 9A does an excellent job of presenting the law 
related to attacks on enemy merchant ships. Query, however, whether a future 
revision might combine the three recitations for surface, sub-surface and air 
attacks, since the lists of permitted targets and the list offorbidden targets are the 
same, the only differences being the circumstances of warning and post-attack 
procedures. Query also whether the whole list approach might be scrapped in 
favor of a general warning and navicert system plus use of temporary exclusion 
and war zones. On the other hand, a naval commander may not wish to disclose 
his presence, which is implicit in an exclusion zone warning. Moreover, in an 
all-ocean long war, exclusion zones may not be feasible as a matter of law in 
practice. Depending on development of the law of nonbelligerent interdiction 
as well as principles for merchant ship interdiction during armed conflict, the 
same methodologies for each procedure should be devised, to minimize con-
fusion and simplify command and training problems. This, of course, is a 
function oflaw development and practice and not a suggestion for revision of 
NWP 9A, which reflects the law. Last, NWP 9A and other manuals should 
reflect the potential for U.N. Security Council action, which occurred in 1950 
during the Korean conflict, again in 1965 with respect to Rhodesia,472 and 
tangentially in other situations. 
d. The IIHL and Other Initiatives. Beginning with the Preliminary Round 
Table of Experts on International Humanitarian Law, held in 1987 at San Remo, 
Italy, the International Institute of Humanitarian Law (IIHL) has sponsored a 
series of conferences at which participants might express views on law of naval 
warfare issues.473 There has been discussion of the possibility of a draft treaty on 
the subject, but later IIHL conversations have considered preparing a "Restate-
ment" approach analogous to the American Law Institute's series of Restatements 
if the LAw in the United States, of which the most relevant for this analysis have 
been the Restatements (Second) and (Third), Foreign Relations if the United States.474 
The IIHL, founded in 1970, has a primary goal of promoting the application, 
development and dissemination of international humanitarian law as well as 
promoting human rights. Experts, from governments appearing in private 
capacities, from the academic community, and from the private sector have been 
invited to these conferences. A 1987 meeting resulted in an outline of basic 
principles of humanitarian law and outlined areas needing discussion in light of 
these principles. The 1988 meeting adopted a plan of action envisaging a series 
of further annual meetings to draft part of the Restatement-style document to 
serve "as a guide to accepted standards with possibly some compromise solutions 
where necessary. ,,475 The last of the annual meetings was to be held in 1992. 
Thus far only the 1987 meeting papers and proceedings,476 the preparatory work 
for the 1988 meeting,4n and the principal papers and commentaries for the 1989 
and 1990 meetings have been published.478 Besides the IIHL initiative, other 
groups of scholars have considered the subject, notably at the annual meetings 
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of the American Society ofInternational Law,479 at Syracuse University, and at the 
Naval War College,480 the latter of which sponsored the papers in this volume. 
Participants in the Syracuse and Naval War College meetings were for the most 
part members of the U.S. Planning Group, an informal association of U.S. 
academicians interested in the subject.481 Although three of the III-IL roundtables and 
publication of the predecessor volume in the War College International Law 
Studies series482 have occurred after the convening of the Naval War College 
symposium that resulted in publication of this book, it is appropriate to consider 
the principal papers presented to the IIHL experts insofar as they relate to the subject. 
The Restatement approach of the IIHL has been criticized as a "precipitous 
move" to formulation of rules by a codification accomplished by private 
individuals who are not state representatives. "The term restatement causes 
confusion when the participants in the process are identified helter-skelter as 
academics or representatives of governments. . . . [T]here is a great need to 
identify state practice, but [there should be] restraint on the rush to codify.,,483 
Despite these objections, the IIHL project is nearing completion, although its 
final product had not been published by press time for this volume. Drafts ofits 
work have been circulated, but these cannot be assessed because they are subject 
to revision. Despite the criticisms of and limitations on the IIHL and other 
studies, the result will contribute, albeit perhaps at a secondary level,484 to the 
law of naval warfare. 
(1) The 1987 IIHLMeeting at San Remo 
In 1987, the UHL 
Round Table identified the most difficult areas in the law of naval warfare today 
as first, when arme.d force could be used at sea, including the concepts of 
self-defense, necessity, and proportionality, and second, neuttality and belligerent 
rights at sea. The group then decided to focus on humanitarian issues and 
reaffirmed in a resolution the basic principles applicable to all kinds of war, namely, 
that the choice of means of warfare is not unlimited, that there must be a balance 
between military and humanitarian considerations, and that victims of war and 
the rights ofneuttals must be respected.485 
The 1987 meeting at San Reina, Italy, had for its preparatory work The Law if 
Naval Waifare.486 Although only a published version of the preparatory essays, 
and therefore only a secondary source for international law ,487 the book may 
gain considerable importance because it republishes international agreements 
and other documents, e.g., the 1913 Oxford Manual cifNaval Warfare, together 
with commentaries by scholars on each document. For that reason, the con-
clusions of the commentators on the law of naval warfare affecting the targeting 
of merchant vessels are worth summarizing. Except for regional agreements 488 
and an introductory essay, The Law cifNaval Waifare takes a chronological course, 
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beginning with the 1856 Declaration ofParis.489 Not all agreements affecting the 
law of naval warfare, e.g. the 1958 law of the sea conventions, are analyzed, 490 and 
some that only tangentially impact it, e.g., Protocol I to the Geneva Convention of 
1949, are included. Nevertheless, The lAw of Naval Warfare is overall a useful book. 
Professor Ronzitti's introductory essay asserts that the conflicts between 1945 
and 1990, analyzed in this chapter, have had a tendency to be fought close to 
the belligerents' coasts and "even to their territorial waters. However, [he said] 
it is difficult to say whether this practice is dictated by :i legal conviction to do 
so or by consideration of advantage, as, [e.g.,] when belligerents have limited 
naval capability.,,491 When the records of Korea and the Gulf War are added to 
the situations cited, e.g., the 1971 India-Pakistan war and the 1980-88 Tanker 
War, it is clear that state practice confirms the right of belligerents to conduct 
naval operations far from home (e.g., the United Kingdom and the United States 
in Korea, both belligerents in the India-Pakistan war, many nations in the Tanker 
War and the Gulf War) on the high seas as well as in the territorial sea. Ronzitti 
also questions the legality of the 1982 United Kingdom TEZ around the 
Falklands as violating the U.N. Charter, Article 51, while not mentioning the 
Argentine War Zone of the entire South Atlantic Ocean. Whether his view is 
correct is debatable.492 
Professor Guttry sees the 1907 Hague Convention (VI) Relating to the Status 
of Enemy Merchant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities as being somewhat 
useful today in the protection of private property at sea, citing state practice since 
its signature.493 Professor Venturini observes problems with practice since 1907 
for the strict terms of Hague Convention (VII) Relating to the Conversion of 
Merchant Ships into Warships, concluding that "it might be argued that State 
practice shows a tendency to the recognition of the combatant status of any 
merchant vessel integrated for all practical purpose[s] into a belligerent navy." 
Whether Professor Venturini would agree with the United States view, stated 
in NWP 9A, depends on how the phrase "integrated for all practical purpose[s]" 
is interpreted.494 Professor Levie's analysis of Hague Convention (VIII) Relating to 
the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines notes that the rule against laying 
unanchored contact mines and the requirements of notice and for removal of mines 
remain valid law, but that these principles' applicability to other types of mines could 
be disputed.495 Professor Shearer's analysis of Hague Convention (XI) Relating 
to Capture in Naval War restates the customary rules flowing from that treaty.496 
Professor Schindler's commentary on Hague Convention (XIII) Regarding 
Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War begins with the important 
point that since the founding of the United Nations: 
lfthe Security Council of the United Nations decides on military or non-military 
enforcement measures according to Articles 39 ff. of the Charter, member States 
which are bound by such a decision have to deviate from the duties of neutrality. 
Their position can be described as one of qualified neutrality or non-belligerency. 
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Neutrality in its strict sense, however, remains possible under the Charter if the 
Security Council is not in a position to take any binding decision or if it takes 
such a decision but does not call upon a particular State to take part in the 
enforcement measures. Neutrality also remains untouched if the Security Council 
decides on enforcement measures when there is only a threat to the peace but no 
armed conflict, as it did in 1966 against South Rhodesia and in 1977 against South 
Africa. The law of neutrality applies only in case of armed conflict. Up to now the 
Security Council has never been able to decide on enforcement measures in case 
of an armed conflict. Members of the United Nations therefore have never since 
1945 been prevented from remaining neutral and applying the law of neutrality. 497 
He concludes that in the Charter era nations may either come to the aid of a 
victim of aggression under the self-defense principles of Article 51 of the Charter, 
remain neutral, or adopt an intermediate position of "nonbelligerency, "i.e., 
assisting the victim by other than military means. States cannot aid the aggressor 
nation.498 The result is that the old law of neutrality can be divided into two 
sets of rules: those applying to all states not party to a conflict, including neutrals; 
and those applying particularly to neutrals only. The rights of neutrals, as well 
as the duty to tolerate certain belligerent measures, belong to all nations not party 
to the conflict, while the duties of abstention, prevention and impartiality apply 
only to neutrals in the strictest sense.499 He concludes that with certain minor 
exceptions, e.g., the impact ofUNCLOS on warship passage through neutral 
territorial waters, the 1907 Convention provisions are part of the customary 
law.soo 
Professor Kalshoven's careful analysis of the 1909 Declaration of London states 
that customary rules prevail today, but that subsequent treaty norms confirm that 
"neutral vessels should not be destroyed without cause."S01 The analysis of 
Professors Nwogugu and Goldie on the 1930 agreements involving submarine 
warfare are helpful recitations of practice that followed on them.s02 Professor 
Prott's analysis of the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention notes the gaps 
for modem naval warfare, given the discovery of underwater archaeological 
discoveries and wrecks and the problems of the text, e.g., the military necessity 
exception included at U.S. and U.K. instance (neither of which are parties to 
the treaty), and that the subject may have lost its immediacy.s03 The rule for 
sunken military aircraft or warships - i.e., that title to them remains in the flag 
stateS04 - is not mentioned, nor is there a citation to the Roerich Pact, a Western 
Hemisphere treaty on the same subject,SOs the 1970 convention on prohibition 
of the transport, etc., of illicitly-taken cultural property,S06 or the 1972 conven-
tion concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage,S07 all 
of which may have naval warfare implications. Professor Bothe's careful analysis of 
1977 Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of1949 notes the general exemption 
of air and naval warfare from the Protocol's terms while dismissing those parts 
that do apply.sos Unfortunately, there is little discussion of general customary rules 
enbedded in Protocol I and the possible impact of such customs, thus 
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strengthened by repetition in the Protocol for land campaigns, on war at sea. The 
United States is not a party to the Protocol, and has indicated it will not ratifY it. 
Two regional treaties are also analyzed. The commentator for the 1928 
Havana Convention on Maritime Neutrality, to which the United States is a 
party, notes that the Convention repeats, and thereby strengthens, the rules of 
Hague Convention (XIII) Concerning the &ights and Duties of Neutral Powers in 
Naval War, being based on World War I experience.509 Professor Bring, comment-
ing on the 1938 Stockholm Declaration Regarding Similar Rules of Neutrality, 
observes that not all Nordic states would observe them today (Denmark and 
Norway being NATO members, for example), but that the rules reaffirm in the 
relevant Hague Convention principles and customary law but today do not 
establish a specific regional or Nordic approach to the law ofneutrality.510 
If it be taken as a handbook for its subject, The LAw oJNaval Warfare represents 
a reasonably complete but not exhaustive collection of relevant agreements and 
documents. There are gaps, as suggested above,511 and later editions will 
doubtless correct these. The commentaries accompanying the documents must 
be employed with care; they are but a secondary source of law, although 
sometimes an important (or the only additional) source for study of a problem. 
At the 1987 San Remo roundtable, Professor Ronzitti found the United 
Kingdom's TEZ around the Falklands/Malvinas512 "difficult to reconcile" with 
the concept of neutrality, insofar as nonbelligerent merchant ships are con-
cemed.513 Both Professor Levie, writing for the conference, and Commander 
Fenrick's earlier article, left open the issue of the TEZ and enemy merchant 
vessels.514 Professor Ronzitti also tentatively concluded that: 
the practice shows a tendency to confine naval operations to areas close to the 
coast of belligerents, and even today, their territorial waters. However, it is difficult 
to say whether this practice is dictated by a legal conviction regarding the coastline 
or by considerations of opportunity, as for instance, when belligerents have limited 
al bil· SIS nav capa Ity. 
Participants subsequently questioned whether enough practice had developed 
to support a customary norm,516 and whether a war zone was unlawful when 
applied to neutrals.517 
Professor Lowe, in another paper prepared for the San Remo conference, 
spoke of war zones in the UNCLOS Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
context: 
The precedents in the Gulf and South Atlantic suggest that the establishment on 
the high seas during hostilities of war zones of reasonable size (having regard to 
the scale of the conflict, the range and type of weapons employed, and the number 
and distribution of ships and other facilities to be protected, and also the interests 
of other users of the seas in that area) is acceptable to the international community, 
as is the declaration that unauthorized ships in the zone may be presumed to 
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threaten combatant ships and facilities therein and are accordingly liable to attack. 
The latter provision obviates the need to setde the question of the right to exclude 
foreign vessels from the zone. 
He also concluded that neutral states had the right to forbid hostile military 
activities in adjacent sea areas "out to such a distance as affords them reasonable 
protection from the consequences of hostilities. " The weight of practice does not 
support the view that military uses can be made of the entire EEZ. "The high seas 
should be regarded as free for all military activities, including those mentioned. " 
Coastal states may restrict such uses on the bases of necessity and proportionality. 
He concluded by suggesting that "any ship, regardless of its nationality, •.. under 
the command, control or direction of combatant military authorities should be 
assimilated to the status of a warship for the purposes of the foregoing rules. ,,518 
Professor Robertson stated that modern naval warfare had made the 1907 
Hague Convention IX, relating to naval bombardment,519 obsolete before its 
entry into force, and noted the general rule of proportionality in Protocol 1520 and 
the advent of modern over-the-horizon weapons. He asked whether the rules 
for attack should be a seaborne version ofProtocoll's proportionality principle 
or perhaps weapon-specific rules.521 The latter approach, he thought, would be 
very difficult.522 The ensuing discussion recognized the problem oflong-range 
weapons, the difficulty of discrimination for certain weapons platforms, and the 
general need to adhere to general rules of military necessity, military objective 
and proportionality, perhaps on the model of the rules of air warfare, while 
excluding certain vessels from attack, e.g., hospital ships and passenger liners.523 
Professor Levie stated that Protocol I did not apply to war at sea and inquired 
whether exclusion zones were a legal method of warfare and whether such zones 
should be limited in scope, and whether state practice had crystallized enough to 
declare themlegitimate.524 Commander Fenrick stated that persuasive arguments 
for their legality could be made, and that common rules for aircraft and 
submarine should be developed.525 The ensuing discussion also raised issues of 
environmental damage resulting from combat at sea.526 
The San Remo conference closed with papers on protected vessels, the 
ensuing discussion noting the "neutral zone" for hospital ships established by the 
United Kingdom,527 rules of engagement and their relationship to armed 
conflict,528 and reprisals.529 
The General Report of the San Remo conference stated: 
The Group of Experts: 
Recalls that the principles and rules of international humanitarian law apply 
impartially to international armed conflicts irrespective of the legality of the initial 
resort to force or the justification given for any such conflict. 
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Recognizes the relevance of the principles ofinternationallaw applicable in anned 
conflict to anned conflict at sea, in particular: 
1) Parties to a conflict and members of their anned forces do not have 
an unlimited choice of methods and means of warfare. The employment of 
weapons or methods of warfare of a nature to cause unnecessary losses or 
excessive suffering is prohibited. 
2) Parties to a conflict shall at all times distinguish between civilian objects 
and military objectives. Attack shall be directed solely against military 
objectives. 
3) Parties to a conflict shall ensure that in cases not covered by explicit 
legal provisions, those involved in an anned conflict remain under 
the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as 
they result from the law of humanity and the dictates of the public 
conscience. 
4) The rules on the conduct of hostilities are subject to the fundamental 
principle of the need to balance military and humanitarian requirements. 
5) Persons hors de combat and/or shipwrecked are entided to respect 
for their lives and their physical and moral integrity. 
Stresses that parties involved in an anned conflict at sea shall respect the rights of 
States not involved in the conflict, 
Notes that new technologies and methods of naval warfare, new developments in 
the law of anned conflict and in the law of the sea and the increased possibilities 
of grave hann to the environment as a result of anned conflict at sea, require study 
in the light of the principles recognized above, 
Notes the various studies and recommendations on the law of anned conflict at 
sea by the United Nations and the International Conferences of the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent, 
Urges the dissemination of the results of ICRC's and competent international 
organizations' work on the technical identification of protected vessels at 
sea, 
Deddes: 
1) To study the means of applying the above-mentioned principles to 
the regulation of anned conflict at sea. The following should be taken into 
consideration, in particular: 
- new technologies, for instance, sea mines and long-range weapons; 
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- means of warfare at sea, for instance, the use of "exclusion zones", ruses 
of war, and submarine warfare; 
- the use of maritime areas, for instance, neutralized zones, cartel ships, 
identification of protected vessels and aircrafts; 
- humanitarian considerations, for instance, neutralized zones, cartel ships, 
identification of protected vessels and aircrafts; 
- scope of application of the law of armed conflicts at sea, for instance, 
low-intensity operations; 
- enforcement of the law of anned conflict at sea, for instance, reprisals, 
prosecutions of war crimes, fact-finding; 
- armed conflict at sea adversely affecting the environment; 
- the needs of shipping of States which are not taking part in the conflict. 
2) To study and develop more effective means to secure the practical 
implementation of the law of armed conflict at sea on a national level, for 
instance, means of instruction to military personnel, including rules of 
530 engagement .... 
The Report is but a secondary source, or evidence oflaw,531 but its themes laid 
out the topics for subsequent IIHL meetings. 
(2) The Madrid Meeting 
At a meeting of the IIHL group in Madrid, Spain, in 1988: 
it was decided that in future meetings the group's efforts should be focused on 
identifying areas of agreement on what the law is, as meetings hitherto had 
principally highlighted areas of disagreement. The participants at the Madrid 
meeting adopted a plan of action that envisioned a series of yearly meetings of 
experts on the law of naval warfare from around the world, including in particular 
military lawyers. Each meeting would operate as a working group to identify 
common areas of agreement and articulate those rules in a document that would 
be similar to a "restatement" of the law of naval warfare.532 
The first of the working groups met in Bochum, Federal Republic of Genna ny, 
the next year. 
(3) The Bochum Roundtable 
At the 1989 Bochum roundtable, Commander Fenrick's paper, The Military 
Objective and the Principle oJDistinction in the LAw oJNaval Warjare,533 i.e., objects 
such as merchantmen that may be legitimately attacked, was presented. After 
reviewing trends in the law, the influence of the 1977 Protocol 1534 to the 
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Geneva Conventions of 1949, and current preparations of military manuals, 
Commander Fenrick concluded: 
If one accepts the most pennissive provisions in the manuals referred to above as 
a starting point, then, on one view, enemy merchant vessels may be attacked and 
destroyed when they: 
a) engage in acts of war on behalf of the enemy such as laying mines, minesweep-
ing, cutting undersea cables, visiting neutral merchant ships or attacking merchant 
ships on one's own side, 
b) act as a de facto auxiliary to an enemy's armed forces by, for example, carrying 
troops or acting as a replenishment vessel, 
c) are incorporated into, or assist in any way, the intelligence system of the enemy's 
armed forces, 
d) are armed, 
e) actively resist visit and search or capture, 
f) refuse to stop upon being duly summoned, 
g) sail under convoy of enemy warships or military aircraft, or 
h) are integrated into the enemy's war-fighting/war-sustaining effort and com-
pliance with the rules of the 1936 London Protocol would, under the circumstan-
ces of specific encounter, subject the attacker to imminent danger or otherwise 
not be feasible. 
Further, neutral merchant ships could be attacked and destroyed for the reasons 
specified under heads (a), (b), (c), (e), (f) and (g) above. It is clear that head (d) 
is not an adequate reason in and ofitself for attacking a neutral merchant vessel. 
The key question which remains, however, is: should neutral merchant ships be subject 
to attack for the reasons specified in head (h)? Is there a valid legal reason why 
neutral merchant ships should be immune from attack when they are employed 
on tasks functionally indistinguishable from those where enemy merchant vessels are 
subject to attack? If neutral merchant ships which are incorporated into the 
enemy's war fighting/war sustaining effort are not, for that reason alone, subject to 
attack then most of the attacks directed by Iraq against neutral tankers travelling to 
and from Iran during the Tanker War were unlawful. It is not essential that 
intemationallaw, to be valid, should always be compatible with state practice. If, 
however, the law of naval warfare is to have an impact on the conduct of warfare, 
there should be a crude congruence between law and practice so that it is marginal, 
extreme conduct which is condemned, not activities which are routine operations 
ofwar.535 
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The analysis does not answer the reciprocal question ofIranian attacks on vessels 
proceeding to and from neutral Kuwaiti or Saudi ports, which would a fortiori be 
illegal, or the sub-issue of Iraqi attacks on vessels proceeding in ballast or with 
cargoes that would not be considered part of an opponent's warfightinglwar-sustain-
ing effort. Ultimately, the Bochum conference found, according to Dr. van 
Hegelsom: 
••• [T]he general principles of military objective and of distinction, as codified in 
the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (Additional Protocol I) 
are valid in the naval-environment .. The experts identified the obligation to 
distinguish at all times between civilians and combatants and between civilian 
objects and military objectives and the obligation to limit attacks stricdy to military 
b. . 536 o ~ect1ves. 
As noted above, the precise formulation of the rules is still in draft form. 
Additional IIHL conferences on the law of naval warfare have been held since 
the Newport conference that is the subject of this book.537 
(4) Appraisal of the IIHL Process 
The discussions of the IIHL conferences have been entirely unofficial; military 
and diplomatic officers have attended in a private capacity, along with academic 
and International Committee of the Red Cross representatives. All the proposals 
have been subject to revision by the conferees, and there has been feedback 
revision in future meetings. Nevertheless, these discussions point toward possible 
development of a "restatement" of rules, perhaps similar to Professor Levie's 
Code, entirely unofficial, and therefore only a secondary source of law,538 or 
perhaps evidence of primary sources of law - custom, treaties and general 
principles - under the Restatement (Third) view.539 As noted above, there has 
been opposition to this approach.54o Whether the IIHL conferences' results, in 
restatement form or otherwise, will have an impact on national manuals on the 
law of armed conflict like NWP 9A, in citations of scholars, or in state practice, 
remains for the future. To the extent that the IIHL work-product is congruent 
with existing and developing custom and general principles or international 
agreements and their interpretations, those primary sources will be reinforced. 
To the extent that the IIHL rules are cited in court decisions or the product of 
researchers, or perhaps incorporated in resolutions of international organizations 
such as the ICRC or the U.N. General Assembly,541 they will remain in the 
huddle of secondary sources or evidences of primary sources. (If the U.N. 
Security Council picks up the IIHL rules as binding norms, they will be elevated 
to primary status.542) Where the IIHL principles state only progressive develop-
ment of the law, e.g., rules concerning attacks on liners that are not part of the 
customary or conventional rules,543 theirinfluence will be the least. Even if the 
IIHL process has no direct impact on the law, it will have had the beneficial 
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function of raising issues and stimulating debate, and thereby bring broader 
attention to bear on the law of naval warfare.544 
III. Summary and Conclusions 
Although there have been at least ten naval conflicts that have involved enemy 
merchant shipping or neutral vessels that have acquired enemy character be-
tween 1945 and 1990, the change in the practice of states has been relatively 
incremental since World War II. The rule book has been thrown out the 
porthole on occasions, e.g., during the 1971 India-Pakistan and the Tanker Wars, 
but not enough to establish a new rule or that there are no rules. One of the 
difficulties in surveying the period has been lack of hard evidence, due to security 
classifications545 and the fact that governments do not publish diplomatic papers 
for many years after the event, and then only selectively. Thus this chapter's 
Discussion and the resulting Summary may be lacking in critical details that could 
alter a view of state practice radically. The reason for this caveat lies in the way 
international law looks at state practice, or custom. Not only must there be a 
sustained practice, but it must be accepted as law by nations affected, under the 
majority view.546 Whether one or two claims would be enough to support a 
trend may be doubtful to some; in almost all recent cases opinion juris - acceptance 
of the practice as law - the record may be meager. The exceptions may be the 
Falklands/Malvinas War (1982) and the Tanker War (1980-88), but even here 
the picture may be less than complete. 
The Korean conflict would seem to have stretched to the line the rule that 
small coastal fishing vessels when plying their trade are not subject to capture or 
attack,547 but the attacks might be justified under another theory generally - but 
not universally - approved today, i.e., destruction of vessels as part of the enemy's 
war-sustaining effect.548 Pretty clearly the small fishing boats and coastal traders 
carrying weapons during the Vietnam War were part of the North Vietnam war 
effort, and attacks were justified.549 The United Kingdom's attack on Nanva! 
was justified on one officially-stated ground, Nanva!'s supporting Argentine 
intelligence, but attack might have been also vindicated because Nanva! was a 
1600-ton trawler and obviously not a coastal boat.55o 
Hospital ships - another forbidden target - were respected during the 
Falklands/Malvinas War through the medium of the "Red Cross box" neutral 
zone - a new wrinkle, borrowed from the law ofland warfare.55t 
The record is mixed on belligerents' attacks on traditional oceangoing ships 
steaming alone. During the Arab-Israeli conflicts, there were attacks on neutral 
vessels and an Israel-bound tanker, and an Egyptian-declared blockade of tankers 
coming from Eilat.552 Whether the Israel-bound tanker was carrying war-sus-
taining petroleum (probably it was) or whether Sinai oil was helping finance the 
Israeli war effort is not clear from the research. During the 1971 India-Pakistan 
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conflict, India instituted naval control of shipping, which would have subjected 
those vessels to Pakistani attack if the Indian vessels were convoyed or were 
involved in the war effort. India declared a blockade of what was then East 
Pakistan (now Bangladesh), and captured Pakistani merchantmen. Whether 
these were supporting the enemy war effort and therefore subject to capture or 
were wrongfully seized is less than clear; one commentator has asserted that India 
. d h rul 553 Ignore tees. 
During the Vietnam conflict the United States published notice ofits mining 
North Vietnamese harbors, thus warning all ships, in accordance with interna-
tionallaw, whether they would have been classified as enemy merchantmen on 
war service or neutrals performing unneutral service. This might be compared 
with the illegal use of mines in the Red Sea and Persian Gul£ U.S.-flag merchant 
vessels were the subject of shoreside attacks, with no evidence that warnings 
were given. Two were sunk, one loaded with cement. There is no evidence of 
a claim by North Vietnam of the cement hauler's being on war service.554 Both 
RFA and STUFT ships were attacked during the Falklands/Malvinas War while 
on war-sustaining missions, and there is no evidence of protests.555 Under 
established principles, both classes of vessels were legitimate targets. 
During the Tanker War, Iraq attacked enemy merchant ships, and was legally 
entided to do so, when these vessels carried Iranian petroleum that would be 
sold or bartered to support the war effort.556 Neutral-flag tankers carrying 
belligerents' petroleum, the sale of which would support the war effort, were 
also subject to attack when convoyed by Iranian warships.557 (If a belligerent 
chose to attack, and was subjected to necessary, proportional defensive responses, 
those responses were also consonant with international law.) On the other hand, 
neutral vessels carrying neutral goods were not subject to attack, and attacks by 
Iran or Iraq on foreign-flag ships of this nature were clearly illegal under 
international law, whether convoyed by neutral nation warships or steaming 
alone.558 Neutral nations could respond proportionally in self-defense to such 
attacks, whether the response came from convoying warships, warships in the 
area, or by other means of self_defense.559 
Blockades in the traditional sense were declared in several of the conflicts 
(Korea, 1950; India-Pakistan, 1971; Arab-Israel, 1973; Iran-Iraq, 1980; 
Lebanon, 1982),560 and the traditional rules seem to have been applied, despite 
the contentions of some that the rules had become functionally obsolete.561 
Quarantine - in which merchantmen supplying an adversary are stopped and 
diverted in a nonwar context "- was an innovation. This practice was first 
developed in the Algerian civil war under a self-defense rationale, and was 
employed by the United States during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, by the 
United Kingdom in the Rhodesian interdiction operation with U.N. Security 
Council approval, and by the United States in mining operations in North 
Vietnamese territorial waters and South Vietnam in the South China Sea.562 
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Some have questioned the legal validity of such operations when the claim has 
been based on self-defense in the wake of the 1986 Nicaragua Case,563 but there 
has been no authoritative guidance on the issue beyond state practice to the 
contrary and the Security Council's decisions in the case of Rhodesia. Under 
the circumstances, a conditional conclusion is that such quarantines are legal 
under a self-defense theory, so long as they are necessary and proportional in 
response and otherwise conform to international norms - e.g., a quarantine 
cannot obstruct freedom of navigation of third-nation warships, nor can it bar 
a hospital ship from a port. 
The period 1945-90 also witnessed a re-emphasis on the exclusion zone used 
perhaps in the Korean War,564 and certainly in the Falklands/Malvinas War,565 
and the Tanker War.566 The principle that has emerged is that such zones are 
legal, so long as they are published and reasonable in area and duration, i.e., that 
they obey the general principles of necessity and proportionality. 567 Wartime 
. I ··d 568 repnsa s may pernut a WI er zone. 
Besides the developing rules from practice, however, decision makers must 
consider the impact of treaty law clearly applicable to naval warfare.569 Two 
post-World War II examples are the GWSEA prohibition on attacks on small 
coastal rescue craft,570 and the 1977 Environmental Modification Conven-
. 571 N ral·· I f I 572 hal· d fr . tIon. ew gene pnnClp es 0 aw, per aps an ogIze om emergIng 
human rights norms,573 may further complicate the picture. 
Then there is the problem of "radiations" from other bodies oflaw that may 
affect the rules of practice in maritime warfare. One recent example is the "Red 
Cross box" concept in the Falklands/Malvinas War, a procedure borrowed from 
the law ofland warfare by the United Kingdom and respected by Argentina.574 
That was a good idea, but consider commentators' attempts to incorporate the 
UNCLOS "genuine link" concept into the rule that enemy character is 
determined by the flag flown,575 or attempts to incorporate 1977 Protocol I 
wholesale into the law of naval warfare.576 Both appear to be erroneous 
conceptions of the current state of the law, but these analyses point the way for 
attempts at possible inclusion of concepts, in whole or in part, from these and 
other sources in future considerations oflaw of naval warfare issues: as established 
practice human rights;577 the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention, not 
in force for the United States but with potential overtones for legitimation of 
state practice;578 the High Seas Convention and UNCLOS;579 the 1977 Protocol 
I additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions;580 the 1981 Conventional 
Weapons Convention;581 and resolutions of the U.N. Security Council or other 
. . I .. 582 mternatlOna orgamzatIons. 
Throughout the 1945-1990 period, commentators assessed the subject matter 
of this paper. These sources, and indeed the new military manuals such as NWP 9A, 
have their place in the analysis, either as secondary sources583 or as expositors of 
state practice to date. It is for this reason that they have been included too, and 
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must be considered along with state practice, treaties, general principles oflaw, 
and other sources. 
In sum, the place of state practice in the law of naval warfare is much more 
complicated today than before advent of the U.N. Charter in 1945. Perhaps it 
is for this reason that the IIHL and others have begun a series of roundtables to 
attempt to "restate" the law of naval warfare.584 Whether this is a wise 
methodology, and whether the results will be acceptable to states, is not clear 
today because of the ongoing nature of the project. What is fairly certain is that 
more than state practice will be considered in its deliberations, and should be 
considered by national decisionmakers assessing law of naval warfare issues 
related to projected or ongoing situations. 
There has been discussion of a general treaty on the law of naval warfare.595 
A treaty offers certain advantages: 
(1) If congruent with custom, the rule is strengthened;586 
(2) Treaties may be the preferred source for some states;587 
(3) Custom can be elusive in content, relying on the happenstance practice 
of states during a naval war, and the particulars of a particular practice may be 
sealed in archives for decades; 
(4) State practice for wartime rules during armed conflict can be an awfully 
expensive way to write law; 
(5) For naval decision makers, there is the advantage of a "black letter" format, 
e.g., the 1949 Geneva Conventions' provisions; 
(6) Training in the subject can be simpler; the black letter format of treaties 
lends itself to easier learning. 
These propositions could be countered: 
(1) Inconsistent custom can eventually obliterate an outmoded treaty;588 
(2) If a treaty is tied to current technology, it may be out of date before the 
ink is dry,589 and the problems of arguing by analogy or under the principle 
inclusio unius exclusio may arise; 
(3) Custom has the advantage of adapting to new situations that cannot now 
be contemplated;590 
(4) Treaties are always subject to reservations or understandings by the 
signatories, which can result in as much confusion as to the state of the law as 
in the case of custom, an example being Soviet bloc and other reservations to 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions;591 
(5) If issues over which there is sharp disagreement arise during the treaty 
negotiation process, the result can be protracted negotiations, a breakup of the 
negotiations with no treaty resulting, states may refuse to sign, as in the case of 
U.S. refusal to sign UNCLOS, states may decline to ratify the agreement, as in 
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the case of the United States and SALT II, or a treaty that reflects the lowest 
common denominator on the subject may result, which accomplishes little; 
(6) The internal ratification process for many nations can result in outright 
rejection of the treaty, considerable delays, further reservations by the legislative 
body (e.g., the Senate under the U.S. Constitution), or lack oflegislative support 
for implementing statutes;592 
(7) Carefully-written "black letter" rules for custom can be incorporated into 
military manuals, to be employed by decisionmakers or in an instructional 
setting.593 Indeed, it has been necessary to condense the detail of treaties such 
as the 1949 Geneva Conventions to make them more understandable for 
users;594 thus a treaty can suffer from ambiguity of words, even as custom carries 
a risk of ambiguity of rules. 
With the demise of the Soviet Union and a resulting unipolar world with the 
United States as the only true military superpower, the inclination to engage in 
multilateral agreement negotiations may be decreasing. State practice may be 
the rising modality for determining internationallaw.595 The continued trends 
in fragmentation of nations - Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Yugoslavia being 
the most recent examples - would suggest that the babble of claims and 
counterclaims596 as to what is the law, or should be the law, further militates 
. b . . h 597 Y hi fd· . agamst egmmng t e treaty process now. et t s very process 0 lSlntegra-
tion and the resultant relative weakness of nations to counter threats from within 
and without argues for establishment of some norms to guide what may be the 
beginning of a new season of conflict. For now, the patchwork of traditional 
custom and general principles, treaties perhaps modified by practice or inter-
pretation, and the often-conflicting urgings of scholars and groups such as the 
IIHL, plus the modifications in state practice that have characterized naval 
conflicts since World War II, will be the principal guide to naval powers as they 
confront relatively new bodies oflaw pressing from the periphery. The latter 
include the U.N. Charter, UNCLOS, the 1977 Protocols, and the law of human 
rights. The result may be the dawn of a new world order or a fresh descent into 
international chaos. 
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Charter, art. 51, but that the United States was not entitled to rely on collective self-defense because Nicaragua's 
providing rebels in El Salvador with arms or logistical or other support was not an "armed attack," so that the 
right of self-defense was not triggered. 19861.CJ. at 94-100,103-05, citing, inter alia, the Rio Treaty, supra 
note 205, art. 3, 62 Stat. at 1700, T.I.A.S. No. 1838,21 U.N.T.S. at 95-97, which articulates the inherent 
right of self-defense of U.N. Charter, art. 51. The quarantine response was under article 6 and 8, which 
involved "aggression •.. not an armed attack." 
207. S.C. Res. 216, 217, U.N. Docs. S/RES/216, 217 (1965), reprinted in 5 Int'l Legal Mat'ls 167-68 
(1966). 
208. Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 19, at 174-75, referring to S.C. Res. 221, U.N. Doc. S/RES1221 
(1965), reprinted in 5 Int'l Legal Mat'ls 534 (1966). See also James Cable, supra note 77, at 123-26; Daniel P. 
O'Connell, supra at 137-38. The United States generally complied. Exec. Order No. 11322, 3 C.F.R. 243 
(1967 Compil.). Congress made an exception for Rhodesian chrome ore exports to the United States. See 
Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461, 465-67 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1972). The chrome ore exception 
was removed by 1977 legislation. See 22 U.S.C. § 287c (1988) and Act of Mar. 18, 1977,91 Stat. 22. 
209. 16 Keesing's Contemporary Archives 22525 (1968). 
210. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 232, U.N. Doc S/RES/232 (1966) and S.C. Res. 253, U.N. Doc. S/RES/253 
(1968), terminated by S.C. Res. 460, U.N. Doc. S/RES/460 (1979), reprinted in Karel C. Wellens, supra note 
42,at84-89,104-05. 
211. See irifra notes 569-73 and accompanying text. 
212. See supra notes 89, 92-93, infta notes 373-77, 399,425-27, and accompanying text. 
213. Cj. U.N. Charter, art. 42. See also NWP 9A, supra note 4, paras. 4.3.2, 7.7, and irifra note 229 and 
accompanying text. 
214. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
215. Government of Pakistan v. R.S.N. Co., Ltd., 40 I.L.R. 472 (High Ct. of Dacca, Pakistan, 
1965). 
216. &egmerally P. Sharma, The Indo-Pakistan Maritime Conflict, 1965: A Legal Appraisal (1970). For an 
abbreviated discwsion of Charter issueS, Sie supra notes 11-32 and accompanying text. The Indian Navy effort 
during the Goa campaign of the early sixties was "confined to territorial waters." D. K. Palit, The Lightning 
Campaign: The Indo-Pakistan War 1971, at 145 (1972). Goa generated heated debate in the U.N. Security 
Council and a World Court decision that in effect supported India's occupation of the Portuguese enclave. 
See Status of Goa, 16 U.N. SCOR (987dt mig) at 10-11, 16; id. (988dt mtg.) at 7-8; Case Concerning Right of 
Passage Over Indian Territory (port. v. India), 1960 I.CJ. 6. The initial Pakistani list of absolute contraband 
included: 
(a) All kinds of arms, ammunitions and explosives, and all kinds of materials or appliances suitable 
for use in chemical, biological or atomic warfare; machines for the manufacture or repair of any of the 
foregoing; component parts thereof, articles necessary or convenient for their use; materials or 
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ingredients used in their manufacture; articles necessary or convenient for the production or use of 
such materials or ingredients. 
(b) Fuel of all kinds; all contrivances for, or means of, transportation on land, in water or air, 
and machines used in their manufacture or repair, component parts thereof; instruments, articles 
and animals necessary or convenient for their use; materials or ingredients used in their 
manufacture, articles necessary or convenient for the production or usc of such materials or 
ingredients. 
(c) All means of communication, tools, implements, instruments, equipment, maps, pictures, 
papers and other articles, machines, or documents necessary or convenient for carrying on hostile 
operations; articles necessary or convenient for their manufacture or usc. 
(d) Precious metals and objects made thereof, coin bullion, currency, evidence of debts, deben-
tures, bonds, coupons, materials, dies, plates, machinery, or other articles necessary or convenient for 
their production, manufacture. 
Schedule II on conditional contraband comprised: 
All kinds offood, foodstuffi, feed, forage and clothing and manufactured textile products; tobacco, 
articles and material necessary or convenient for their production, manufacture or use. 
A later list did not distinguish between absolute and conditional contraband: 
(a) All kinds of arms and ammunitions and explosives; their components and ingredients, 
radio-active materials. 
(b) Crude oil and fuel and lubricants of all kinds. 
(c) All means of transportation on land, in water or air, and components thereof. 
(d) Electronics and telecommunication equipment. 
(e) Optical equipment specially designed for military use. 
(f) Precious metals and objects made thereof, coin bullion, currency, evidence of debts, debentures, 
bonds, coupons, stocks, and shares or any negotiable or marketable security; precious or semi-precious 
stones, jewels. 
WoIffvon Heinegg, supra note 147, at 30, dting All Pak. Legal Decisions 437, 472 (1965). In September 1965 
India copied the initial Pakistani list of absolute contraband. No list was officially ratified. Wollfvon Heinegg, 
supra, at 30. 
217. 15 Keesing's Contemporary Archives 21327 (1966). 
218. Panel, supra note 19, at 171 (Remarks by Professor Lagoni), referring to U.N. General Assembly 
Resolution 2162 of Dec. 5,1966. 
219. &e supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. 
220. A U.S. naval task force, sent to facilitate evacuation of U.S. nationals from Bangladesh, arrived 
after hostilities were over. D. K. Palit, supra note 216, at 144-50; Wolff von Heinegg, supra note 
147, at 31. Both belligerents published contraband lists, including materials traditionally considered absolute 
contraband. NWP 9A, supra note 4, para. 7.4.1, at 7.25 n. 98, citing Belligerent Interference with Neutral 
Commerce, in Contemporary Practice cifthe United States Relating to International Law, 66 Am.]. Int'l L. 
386-87 (1972). Pakistan issued a contraband list almost identical with that of1965, supra note 216, with these 
additions: 
(g) Implements and apparatus for manufacture or repair of all types of military hardware equipment. 
(h) All other types of goods and equipment, and parts and accessories thereof, that can be used or 
may assist in the conduct of war. 
&esupra note 216. 
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India tr:msmitted this contraband list to the New Delhi diplomatic community: 
1. arms of all kinds, including arms for sporting purposes, and their distinctive component parts, 
2. projectiles, charges, and cartridges of all kinds, and their distinctive component parts, 
3. powder and explosives specially prepared for use in war, 
4. gunmountin~, limber boxes, limbers, military wagons, file forges, and their distinctive 
component parts, 
5. clothing and equipment of a distinctively military character, 
6. all kinds of harness of a distinctively military character, 
7. saddle, draught, and pack animals suitable for use in war, 
8. armour plates, 
10. warships, including boats, and their distinctive component parts of such nature that they can 
only be used on a vessel of war, 
11. aeroplanes, airships, balloons, and aircraft of all kinds and their component parts, together with 
accessories and articles recognizable as intended for use in connection with balloons and aircraft, 
12. implements and apparatus designed exclusively for the manufacture of war, for the manufacture 
or repair of arms, or war material for use on land and sea, 
13. surface to surface missiles, surface to air missiles, air to surface rockets and guided missiles and 
warheads for any of the above weapons, mechanical or electronic equipment to support or operate the 
above items, 
14. any other class of materials or items as may assist the army in the prosecution of the armed 
conflict against the Union ofIndia. 
Eight Indian ports were declared subject to control on December 8, and on December IS, 1971 the Bengal 
Chamber of Commerce advised neutral shipping it would not risk attack in the Bay of Bengal if these 
instructions were obeyed: 
(a) No ship should approach Sandheads to a distance less than 40 miles between dusk and dawn. 
(b) Masters should be warned that they are liable whilst on passage in the Bay, to be challenged 
by Units ofIndian Navy to establish their bonafides; they should cooperate and they \vill get courtesy 
and considerate treatment. 
(c) For such ships as have left Calcutta having been detained here on account of their contraband 
cargo, which they had to discharge in accordance with official instructions it is strongly suggested that 
masters should obtain an endorsement from customs to the effect that all contraband cargo has been 
discharged. In addition, it is further recommended that agent should obtain an endorsement from the 
Indian Navy to the same effect and the officer to be contacted in this respect is .•.. 
The next day the Indian Parliament adopted the Naval and Aircraft Prize Act, 1971, which declared in part: 
"Prize" [IS defined as] anything which ••. may be subjected to adjudication .•• including a ship 
or an aircraft and goods carried therein irrespective of whether the ship is captured at sea or seized in 
port or whether the aircraft is on or over land or sea at the time of capture or seizure. [According to 
Section 3 (3) the Act is applicable] during war or as a measure of reprisal during an armed conflict or 
in the exercise of the right of self-defense" [and according to Section 4(3) the Prize Court] ..• shall 
adjudge and condemn all such ships, vessels, aircraft and goods belonging to any country or state or 
the nationals, citizens or subjects thereof. 
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The Act had no practical relevance, but the Indian navy stopped and searched more than 100 neutral merchant 
vessels during the conflict that lasted only two weeks. On December 21, 1971, India suspended visit and search 
of neutral vessels. WoIffvon Heinegg, supra note 147, at 31-33. 
221. Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 19, at 86-87,129; 2 Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 11, at 1099. 
222. See supra footnote 220. 
223. WoIffvon Heinegg, supra note 147, at 33. 
224. Fred Greene, The Indian-Pakistan War and the Asian Power Balana, 25 Nav. War Coil. Rev. 16 (No. 
3,1973). 
225. These dates have been chosen because 1962 marked the first major infusion of u.s. forces into 
Vietnam; Pte last u.s. service people left in 1973, although U.S. aid continued through 1975. Seegenerally 
Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History 247-69, 655-56, 661, 678, 684 (1983); Louis Henkin, supra note 19, at 
303-12. 
226. R.L. Schreadly, The Naval War in Vietnam, 1950-1970, in Frank Uhlig, Jr., Vietnam: The Naval 
Story 274, 280-87 (1986); James A. Hodgman, Market Time in the Gulf of Thailand, id. 308; see also 2 D.P. 
O'Connell, supra note 11, at 1097-99, 1122-23, and Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 19, at 176-77. 
227. W J. Fenrick, supra note 62, at 18; Fenrick, supra note 62, at 256. Cf. Hague XI, supra note 55, art. 
3,36 Stat. 2408-09, T.S. No. 544; Institute ofInternational Law, Oxford Manual of Naval War, arts. 3, 12,37, 
(1913), in Law of Naval Warfare, supra note 1, at 2n, 280, 282, 293; The Pacquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 
(1900); W. Thomas Mallison, supra note 195, at 15-16, 126-28 (1968). See also supra notes 61-96 and 
accompanying text. 
228. 2 EdwardJ. Marolda & Oscar P. Fitzgerald, The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict 518 
(1986). The original defense zone was promulgated in Republic of Vietnam Decree on Sea Surveillance, Apr. 
27, 1965, in 4 Int'l Legal Mat'ls 461 (1965). 
229. 2 EdwardJ. Marolda & Oscar D. Fitzgerald, supra note 228, at 118-20. 
230. !d. at 228-39. 
231. !d. at 309. Like much of the rest of the RVN Navy, it was supplied by the United States. !d. at 311. 
232. Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 19, at 325; von Heinegg, supra note 147, at 34. 
233. Lane C. Kendall, U.S. Merchant Shipping and Vietnam, in Frank Uhlig, Jr., supra note 226, at 482, 
491, 499-500. 
234. W J. Fenrick, supra note 62, at 18; id at 256, riting Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 19, at 110. 
235. 1 Edwin Hooper et al., supra note 88, ch. 12; Daniel M. Redmond, Getting Them Out, 116 U.S. 
Nav. Instit. Proc. 44 (No.8, 1990). About a million Vietnamese went south, 560,000 by ship, 240,000 by 
airlift, and over 140,000 on foot or by boat. 
236. Horace B. Robertson,Jr., New Technologies and Armed COI!f/ic/$ at Sea, 14 SyracuseJ. Int'l L. & Comm. 
699,703 (1988). 
237. WJ. Fenrick, supra note 62, at 18; WJ. Frenrick supra, note 62, at 256-57; Swayze, Traditional 
Prindples of Blockade in Modern Practice: United States Mining of Internal and Territorial Waten of NOr/I, VIetnam, 
29 JAG J. 143 (1977); Bruce A. Clark, Recent Evolutionary Trends Concerning Naval Interdiction of Seabome 
Commerce as a VIable Sanctioning Device, 27 id. 160 (1973). See also Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 19, at 94-95. 
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inland waters and rivers of North Vietnam had been mined. For other political and operational aspects of the 
campaign, see Ulrik Luckow, VIctory Over Ignorance and Fear: The U.S. Mine/aying Attack on NOr/h VIetnam, 35 
Nav. War Coil. Rev. 17 (No.1, 1982). 
238. 2 EdwardJ. Marolda & Oscar P. Fitzgerald, supra note 228, at 320-25. 
239. 18 Keesing's Contemporary Archives 25338 (1972). 
240. Cf. NWP 9A, supra note 4, para. 8.2.3, at 8-21 n. 65. 
241. Seegenerally id., para. 7.7.5; Frank B. Swayze and Bruce A. Clark, supra note 237. 
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244. GWSEA, supra note lOS, arts. 22-35, 6 V.S.T. at 3234-40, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 V.N.T.S. at 
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245. Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 19, at 10-12; Bruce Swanson, supra note 86, at 268-69. The PRC 
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246. Eleanor C. McDowell, supra note 166, at 13-15, 423-26, 766, m-83, 879-86; Arthur W. Revine 
and Eleanor C. McDowell, Contemporary Practice of the Unitcd States Relating /0 IntemationalLAw, 69 Am.J. Int'l 
L. 861-63, 874-79 (1975); U.S. Recoven Merchant Ship Seized by Cambodian Navy, 72 Dep't St. Bull. 719-22 
(1975); Thomas E. Behuniak, n,e Seizure and Recovery of tile S.S. Mayaguez: A Legal Analysis of United States 
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248. 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 159, arts. 14-17, 15 U.S.T. 1610-11, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 
516 U.N.T.S. 214-16; UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts. 17-26. 
249. 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 159, art. 24, 15 U.S.T. 1612-13, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 
516 U.N.T.S. 220; UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 3l. 
250. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass 
Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Roor and in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, art. 1,23 U.S.T. 
701,704-07, T.I.A.S. No. 7337. 
251. CJ. Luigi Migliorino, Commentary, in Law of Naval Warfare, supra note 1, at 615,620; Horace B. 
Robertson,Jr., A Legal Regimefor the Resources if the Seabed and Subsoil if the Deep Sea: A Brewing Problemfor 
International Lawmakers, Nav. War Col. Rev. 61 (Oct. 1968); Tullio Treves, Military Installations, Structures, 
and Dtvim on the Seabed, 74 Am. J. Int'l L. 808 (1980); RexJ. Zedalis, A Response,75 id.926 (1981), and 
Tullio Treves, Reply, id. 933 (1981); discuss these issues in the context of the UNCLOS, supra note 2, 
negotiations. For analysis of UNCLOS in the context of merchant ship issues, see il!fta notes 304-30 and 
accompanying text.. 
252. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972 [hereinafter 1972 Bacteriological 
Convention], arts. 1-4,26 U.S.T. 583, 587-88, T.I.A.S. No. 8062. 
253. CJ. Vaughan Lowe, Commentary, in The Law of Naval Warfare, supra note 1, at 640,648. 
254. 1972 Bacteriological Convention, supra note 252, art. 8, 26 U.S.T. 589, T.I.A.S. No. 8062, riferring 
to Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, and U.S. reservation, Dec. 16, 1974,26 U.S.T. 571, 
T.I.A.S. No. 8061, 94 L.N.T.S. 65. 
255. Howard S. Levie, Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, in Horace B. Robertson,Jr., supra note 
19, at 331,335-45. NWP 9A, supra note 4, paras. 10.3.2.1, 10.4.2, states the U.S. position that first use of 
chemical weapons and any use of biologicals would violate customary intemationallaw. 
256. Vaughan Lowe, supra note 253, at 641,647-48. 
257. U.N. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977 [hereinafter 1977 Environmental Modification Convention], arts. 
1-2,31 U.S.T. 333, T.I.A.S. No. 9614. 
258. Luis Rodriguez, Commftltary, in The Law of Naval Warfare, supra note 1, at 661); see also Comment, 
Weather Genesis and Weather Nelllralization: A New Approach 10 Weather Modijication, 6 Cal. W. Int'l LJ. 412 
(1976). 
259. Michael Bothe et al., New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflict 290-91 (1982); Michael Bothe, 
Commentary, in The Law of Naval Warfare, supra note 1, at 760; Yves Sandoz et al., Commentary on the 
Additional Protocols of8 June 1979 to the Geneva Conventions of12 August 1949, at 605-06 (1987); W.F. 
Fenrick, supra note 62, at 41; Howard S. Levie, Means and Methods if Combat at Sea, 14 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & 
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W J. Fenrick, The Rule ifProportionality and Protocol I in Conventional Warfare, 9B Mil. L. Rev. 91 (1982); Louise 
Doswald-Beck, supra note 261, at60l. 
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269. Protocol r, supra note 260, art. 56, in The Law of Naval Warfare, supra note 1, at 729-30. 
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271. George H. Aldrich, New Ufofor the Laws if War, 75 Am.J. Int'l L. 764, 778 (19Bl). 
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for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armaments, Apr. 22, 1930, art. 22, 112 L.N.T.S. 65, 88; 
Proces-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of the Treaty of London, 
Nov. 6, 1936, Rules 1, 2,173 id. 353; to the practice during World War II, detailed in Robert W. Tucker, 
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2n. 1981 Conventional Weapons Convention, supra note 276, Protocol I, in Dietrich Schindler &Jiri 
Toman, supra note 276, at 185. For analysis of the Convention and Protocol I, see J. Ashley Roach, Certain 
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text. 
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Schindler & Jiri Toman, supra note 276, at 190. 
281. Id., Protocol II, art. 1, in Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman, supra note 276, at 185. For further analysis, 
see Burris M. Carnahan, The Law oj Land Waifare: Protocol II to tile United Nations Convention on Certain 
Conventional WeapollS, 103 Mil. L. Rev. 73 (1984). 
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Walker 209 
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